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Introduction
RECENTLY, IN Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, a divided
Federal Circuit panel split over whether isolated, naturally occurring
genes were patentable even if their purified and commercially useful
forms were not found in nature.1 In attempting to limit the patentabil-
ity of inventions derived from natural sources, the plaintiffs pitted the
constitutional requirement for invention against the established scope
of statutory subject matter for patents.2 Although the categories of
statutory subject matter for patents are interpreted broadly, they are
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1. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1333, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2011). By a two-to-one margin, the panel held that at least isolated segments of naturally
occurring genes were patentable, but the two judges who concurred on this point ad-
vanced different rationales for their holding. See id. at 1333, 1351, 1361, 1366; Tony Dutra,
Patent Community Sees Post-Myriad Issues; Expects Either En Banc or High Court Review, 82 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 452 (2011).
2. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1349. See generally Oskar Liivak, The
Forgotten Originality Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. SOC’Y 261 (2005) (arguing that the Patent and Copyright Clause’s mandate to
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founded on—and bounded by—the Constitution’s Patent and Copy-
right Clause, which gives Congress legislative authority to protect the
rights of “authors and inventors.”3 But the Patent and Copyright
Clause’s positive grant of authority is not the only constitutional provi-
sion that limits the scope of patentability. This Comment explores
how the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery and involun-
tary servitude constrains the patentability of genetically engineered or-
ganisms that combine human and animal genes, cells, or embryos.
What legal test should be applied for determining whether
human-animal chimeras and hybrids are patentable?4 The question
requires us to weigh an opportunity for advancing human knowledge
and improving human health against a risk of creating a new, geneti-
cally based indentured servitude. Under the stated policy of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), at least some human-
animal chimeras are not patentable subject matter per se,5 but neither
protect the rights of inventors creates a constitutional originality requirement that bars
patents on naturally occurring gene sequences).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. To be patentable, an invention must meet federal statutory criteria that include
statutory subject matter, utility, novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, written description,
and best mode. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2006). This Comment focuses on the criterion
of statutory subject matter (§ 101) because I view it as the stronger of the two rationales
that the USPTO has offered for its prohibition against patenting humans or excessively
humanlike chimeras. Animals—Patentability, 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT, & TRADEMARK OFFICE 24
(Apr. 7, 1987), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/patog/week53/OG/
TOCCN/item-115.htm (setting forth the statutory subject matter rationale: “A claim di-
rected to or including within its scope a human being will not be considered to be patenta-
ble subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The grant of a limited, but exclusive property
right in a human being is prohibited by the Constitution.”).
In 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) explicitly prohibited the grant
of new patent claims “directed to or encompassing a human organism.” Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 33, 125 Stat. 288, 340 (2011) (barring patent claims to human organisms but applying
the bar only to patents issued after the law’s enactment). The AIA apparently codified the
previous USPTO policy, but by restricting the law’s scope to future patents, its enactors
sidestepped the question of whether the USPTO’s rationales were legally correct. Since the
AIA’s passage, the USPTO has instructed examiners to reject “claim[s] directed to or en-
compassing a human organism” under both the AIA and 35 U.S.C. § 101, stating that this
provision of the AIA “does not change existing law or long-standing USPTO policy that a
claim encompassing a human being is not patentable.” Memorandum from Robert W.
Bahr, Senior Patent Counsel, Office of the Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy,
to Patent Examining Corps (Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_imple-
mentation/human-organism-memo.pdf (instructing patent examiners how to apply the
AIA prohibition). But the USPTO’s memorandum cited its 1987 policy statement without
further explaining its legal basis under § 101. Id.
5. Press Release, USPTO, Media Advisory 98-6: Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having
a Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998) [hereinafter USPTO Media Advisory 98-6], avail-
able at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/1998/98-06.jsp. The 1998 statement set forth the
USPTO’s other rationale, moral utility: “It is the position of the PTO that inventions di-
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the policy’s rationale nor its limits have been described in detail.6 To
describe and to justify such a policy of limited patentability, this Com-
ment proposes a patentability standard for human-animal chimeras
and hybrids, or fusions, based on an analysis of their legal personhood
under the U.S. Constitution.7
Just as animal research has already advanced our knowledge of
biology, research on genetically engineered human-animal fusions
promises to advance our knowledge of human biology. Many of the
arguments supporting animal experimentation also support experi-
mentation with human-animal fusions especially because such crea-
tures would likely have advantages over currently used animal
research subjects.8 Using research subjects with selected and control-
lable human biological characteristics could allow scientists to isolate
and to analyze the roles of distinctively human genes, organs, or bio-
logical subsystems. When it was necessary for understanding these
human characteristics, researchers could attempt dangerous or inva-
sive experiments not ethically permissible on humans.
The most enticing fruit of this knowledge would be more reliable
and more efficient medical research.9 For example, using more
humanlike research subjects should reduce the rate of false positives
and negatives in drug development. The legal requirements to use
rected to human/non-human chimera could, under certain circumstances, not be patenta-
ble because, among other things, they would fail to meet the public policy and morality
aspects of the utility requirement.” Id. The utility requirement finds textual support in the
Patent and Copyright Clause’s mandate to encourage the “useful arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also supra note 4.
6. A search of “chimera” on the USPTO website provided no more detailed official
statements. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov (search “Search our site”
for “chimera”) (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
7. All the patentability criteria have been met for at least some patents claiming ge-
netically engineered human-animal hybrids. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,745,688 col. 209 ll.
35–42 (filed June 20, 2007). Therefore, a substantially humanlike chimera or hybrid could
presumably also meet all the statutory requirements for patentability if its patentability
were not barred by constitutional limits to § 101. See, e.g., Ryan Hagglund, Patentability of
Human-Animal Chimeras, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 51, 97–102 (2009)
(discussing the likely novelty and nonobviousness of some human-animal chimeras).
8. Although colorable arguments against animal experimentation exist, addressing
them is outside this Comment’s scope. Instead, this Comment assumes what I take to be
the currently governing legal standard in human relations to animals. Some practices are
prohibited as gratuitously cruel, such as dog-fighting or recreational torture of cats. But
other practices that cause pain to animals, such as some forms of food production or scien-
tific experimentation, are permitted or even required.
9. See, e.g., Carrie F. Walter, Note, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: Current Patent Practice and
the Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent Law, 73 IND. L.J. 1025, 1029–31 (1998)
(discussing the possible medical advantages of transgenic animals with human genes).
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animal models in early-phase drug research10 mean that some drugs
that are effective only in the animal models could advance to later,
more expensive phases of drug discovery before their rejection. Worse
still, beneficial drugs can be wrongly eliminated from consideration
because of idiosyncratic side effects specific to a nonhuman model.
Animal models with a more human physiology should respond more
similarly to humans and prevent many of these costly errors.
But this attractive prospect of scientific and medical advancement
has an associated risk. Unless human-animal fusions were treated as
animals, their advantages over consenting human subjects would be
removed. As an engineered animal received more human cells or
genes, however, it would acquire more humanlike characteristics. If a
human-animal fusion became substantially equivalent to a human but
was wrongly categorized as a nonperson, this would yield horrific re-
sults.11 For example, animal research trials sometimes require animal
sacrifice: the killing of animal subjects at the trial’s end to evaluate
10. See Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved
/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/default.htm (last visited
Apr. 23, 2012) (describing the U.S. administrative requirements for marketing a new drug,
which include animal testing).
11. This argument relies on the premises that nonconsensual medical experimenta-
tion on persons is a grave harm and that the law should prohibit this harm. But at least one
commentator has proposed that in some borderline cases, the moral status of a human-
animal chimera may be indeterminate. Robert Streiffer, Chimeras, Moral Status, and Public
Policy: Implications of the Abortion Debate for Public Policy on Human/Nonhuman Chimera Re-
search, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 238, 242–44 (2010). In such cases, nonconsensual experimen-
tation should be prohibited as overly risky. The possible harm—nonconsensual, possibly
fatal medical experimentation on a humanlike creature—is great, which makes its effective
weight greater (i.e., a greater expected mean value, or the harm weighed by the probability
of its occurrence). And regardless of any skepticism about the validity of moral harm as a
legal justification, the harm is not solely moral to the experimental subject, who may expe-
rience intense pain, disfigurement, or death. Many statutory and administrative restrictions
or legal presumptions are imposed not because of definite, proven harms for each individ-
ual case, but because of the greater incidence of harm if the behavior were unregulated
(e.g., required warnings for rare, but serious side effects of prescription drugs; the prohibi-
tion of drunk driving). If the status of a chimera were impossible to establish with certainty,
a presumption against a possibly great harm is prudence, not timidity. See id. at 244 (assert-
ing that “invasive, painful, and lethal experiments” are inappropriate for borderline cases);
cf. Francis J. Beckwith, When You Come to a Fork in the Road, Take It?: Abortion, Personhood, and
the Jurisprudence of Neutrality, 45 J. CHURCH & ST. 485, 493 (2003) (criticizing an argument
for abortion rights when the status of the fetus is indefinite). Note that unlike the analo-
gous argument against abortion rights, restrictions on medical experimentation do not
limit any person’s decision whether to reproduce, which weakens the argument against
them. See Streiffer, supra, at 247.
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their physical condition or to end suffering caused by the trial.12 Al-
though this may be permissible treatment for rats, a similar research
protocol applied to near-humans would justly trouble many people,
for the line between human researchers and their nonperson research
subjects would increasingly become arbitrary.
How would the right to patent human-animal fusions matter in
determining what kinds of human-animal experimentation were possi-
ble? In general, patents provide an incentive for applied scientific re-
search in the patentable area.13 The right to exclude provided by
patents14 can deter third-party free riders from using a patented tech-
nical innovation without direct benefit to the innovator.15 This is
often a prerequisite for substantial corporate investment in a technol-
ogy.16 Further, because patents require a written description showing
others how to make and use the invention,17 the patents’ publication
would disseminate knowledge regarding how to make human-animal
fusions, which would encourage and assist other such research.
But perhaps most importantly, a particular thing’s patentability
imputes at least two aspects of property to it. If a human-animal fusion
were patented, the patent owner, or patentee, would have a right to
prevent others from interacting with the patented creature in ways
that would infringe the patent. Thus, the patent right to exclude also
would be a right to prevent certain actions that the creature could
otherwise perform. And this right to constrain actions could be freely
alienated, or transferred, to another person through a sale of the pat-
ent. These qualities—the right to exclude and the right to alienate—
are among those typically associated with a property owner’s control
12. See INST. FOR LAB. ANIMAL RESEARCH, NAT’L ACADS., GUIDE FOR THE CARE AND USE
OF LABORATORY ANIMALS 27–28, 123–24 (8th ed. 2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=12910 (providing guidelines for the euthanasia of animal sub-
jects at protocol-specific endpoints or to relieve pain or distress).
13. F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 66–71 & n.157 (5th ed. 2011)
(discussing the economic incentives that patents in theory provide). The Patent and Copy-
right Clause explicitly states that its purpose is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006); KIEFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 3–4 (discussing the
right to exclude that a patent confers).
15. KIEFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 62–63 (discussing the inventor’s paradox and the
free-rider problem for inventions).
16. Id. at 68–70 (discussing the patent’s economic incentive to commercialize an
invention).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (providing the statutory basis for the enablement require-
ment, which mandates that a patent discloses how to make and use its claimed inventions).
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over property.18 Whether a creature is property under the control of
others will affect the likelihood and extent of experimentation per-
formed upon it: an owner need not ask property for its consent.
To avoid this harm, this Comment sets forth a proposed test for
fusion organisms’ patentability: the source-dependent presumption of
humanity. For individual organisms that formerly were biologically
human, the presumption would be nonrebuttable, and they would re-
ceive the same legal status as humans at the same developmental
stage. Once recognized as a legal person, no organism would have its
status as a person stripped away.19 For individual nonhuman orga-
nisms incorporating some human genetic material,20 the presumption
of humanity would be rebuttable. This would allow patenting and le-
gal ownership of human-animal fusion organisms if their inventors
18. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 1–6 (2d ed. 1993) (dis-
cussing the concept and elements of property); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 81 (6th
ed. 2006) (listing property’s “bundle” of rights as including rights to possess, to use, to
exclude, and to transfer).
19. More precisely, no legal rights could be taken away except by processes that would
also apply to unmodified human beings: the test is not intended to give fusion organisms
more rights than standard humans. Thus, if a fusion-organism person were convicted of a
crime, it could be imprisoned whenever an analogous human criminal could be. And when
a fusion-organism person died, its legal personhood would be extinguished at death analo-
gously to a human’s, leaving only a few, residual rights, such as its decedent’s rights under
estate law.
20. Here, “human genetic material” indicates synthesized genes or artificial cells in-
corporating substantially the same genetic information as a human organism, as well as any
cells, cell lines, or genes originally taken from a human organism. Either specific human
genetic content or use of a human cell source would meet the threshold to trigger the test.
This would prevent attempts to circumvent the standard through use of “copied” human
biological materials duplicated by biotechnological techniques but substantially identical
in function to the “original” materials. For example, a cloned cell created with an artifi-
cially produced copy of a parent human organism’s genome would count as human ge-
netic material.
A possible objection to a genetic standard is the complaint that reducing human per-
sonhood to a genetic description would provide inadequate protection for embryo experi-
mental subjects or for near-humans with human qualities but a different genetic code. See,
e.g., Nora O’Callaghan, Human Origin and Human Rights in the Genome Age, 3 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 123, 124 (2005) (criticizing genetic reductionism as providing inadequate support for
human rights). Under the standard for personhood proposed in Part IV, though a geneti-
cally engineered creature’s gene sequence is not always determinative, it does influence
the standard for identifying the creature’s legal status.
But as a part of a test setting identifiable limits to patentability, a genetic description
should provide some advantages. Given the associated fields of biological science necessary
to make a human-animal fusion, any patent claiming such a creature will very likely de-
scribe it in biological or genetic terms. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,745,688 col. 209 ll. 35–42
(filed June 20, 2007) (describing a genetically engineered mouse that produces a human
protein implicated in Alzheimer’s disease). Thus, any proposed guidelines to patentability
that were expressed in these terms would be more easily applied.
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could show that their inventions were substantially dissimilar to
human persons. For nonhuman organisms incorporating no human
genetic material, but with humanlike characteristics, no presumption
of humanity would apply. Their legal personhood would be assessed
based on their capabilities.21
Part I of this Comment describes the types of human-animal fu-
sions and summarizes the history of the USPTO’s changing attitude
toward patenting living things. Part II discusses the law interpreting
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery and involuntary
servitude, while Part III shows why this amendment would also pro-
hibit patent rights in a legal person. Part IV sets forth a proposed stan-
dard for identifying when a human-animal fusion would qualify as a
legal person. Part V discusses some possible difficulties with the test in
practice and how these difficulties could be overcome.
I. Background: Human-Animal Fusions at the USPTO
To provide the starting point for its argument, this Comment will
first define what it means by the terms human-animal chimeras, hy-
brids, and fusions. And to provide the historical context for its test, it
will then trace the evolution of the USPTO’s policy on patenting liv-
ing things.
A. Defining Human-Animal Chimeras, Hybrids, and Fusions
Organisms that are combinations of different species are broadly
classifiable as chimera or hybrids.22 A chimera is an organism that in-
21. Despite its title, this presumption of humanity need not always be restricted to
humanity but should be extended to other species—or even artificially created subspe-
cies—in which the individual members typically met the threshold tests for legal per-
sonhood as discussed in Part IV. The presumption’s purpose is to provide greater
protection to the biological group most likely to contain individuals with the relevant ca-
pacities characteristic of human legal persons. Currently, humans are the only group
known to meet this standard. If another species or subspecies showed a high proportion of
individuals meeting the test for personhood, however, that group should also qualify for
the presumption. See, e.g., Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitu-
tional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1496–97 (1992) (setting forth a scheme for classifying the default
personhood of nonhuman species based on their members’ average level of self-
awareness).
22. See Neville Cobbe & Valerie Wilson, Creation of Human-Animal Entities for Transla-
tional Stem Cell Research: Scientific Explanation of Issues That Are Often Confused, in TRANSLA-
TIONAL STEM CELL RESEARCH: ISSUES BEYOND THE DEBATE ON THE MORAL STATUS OF THE
HUMAN EMBRYO 169, 170 (Kristina Hug & Go¨ran Hermere´n eds., 2011) (describing the
broad classes of chimera and “subcellular mixtures”). Their more detailed taxonomy for
interspecies organisms includes interspecies chimeras; transplant recipient chimeras; inter-
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cludes somatic, or nonreproductive, cells from two or more different
creatures.23 Unlike a typical creature, which contains substantially the
same genetic code in each of its cells,24 a chimera has at least two
genetically different, coexisting sets of cells, each with genes from only
one progenitor creature.25 A chimera would not breed true—produce
offspring with the same phenotype, or expressed trait—because any
particular reproductive cell would only contain genetic information
from its individual progenitor.26 One example of a chimera is the
species hybrids, which are produced by the fusion of gametes (i.e., a sperm and an egg);
somatic cell hybrids, which are produced by the fusion of non-gamete cells; cybrids, which
are produced by the transplantation of a cell’s nucleus into another cell’s cytoplasm; and
transgenic animals, which incorporate a gene or genes from another species into their
cells. See id. at 170–76.
23. Id. at 170 (defining the term “chimera”); see also Jason Scott Robert, Regulating the
Creation of Novel Beings, HEALTH L. REV., Winter 2002, at 14, 14 (discussing proposed Cana-
dian legal definitions of “chimera” and “hybrid” embryos). This distinction between so-
matic cells and gametes, or reproductive cells, distinguishes chimeras from hybrids
produced by the fusion of gametes from different progenitor species.
24. A typical creature only has substantially the same genetic code in all its cells be-
cause of mutations in individual cells acquired as the creature ages or is exposed to
mutagens. See How Genes Cause Cancer, STANFORD MED. CLINICAL CANCER CENTER, http://
cancer.stanford.edu/information/geneticsAndCancer/genesCause.html (last visited Aug.
11, 2011) (describing how the gradual mutation of cells produces cancer). These effects
can be clinically important in causing cancer but are different from the more controlled
and more systemic variation of a chimera. See id.
25. This Comment primarily considers chimera incorporating genetic material from
individuals of different species, as a human/human chimera would presumably have
human capabilities. For example, a blood transfusion recipient would be a human/human
chimera until the transfused, genetically different blood cells were replaced through nor-
mal physiological processes. Human/human chimera without noticeable abnormalities
can occur naturally. Neng Yu et al., Disputed Maternity Leading to Identification of Tetragametic
Chimerism, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1545, 1545 (2002), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/
pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa013452 (describing a naturally chimeric woman).
26. This raises one important difference between chimeras and hybrids: the genetic
characteristics of their offspring. Because a chimera includes cells from different progeni-
tors, the genetic identity of its offspring would depend on the individual cells incorporated
into its reproductive system. See id. at 1550–51 (describing a human/human chimera with
children derived from each progenitor’s cells). For a hypothetical intraspecies example, a
fertile male geep—or goat-sheep chimera—with testes derived from goat progenitor cells
would produce full goat offspring with a female goat. See It’s a Geep, TIME, Feb. 27, 1984, at
69 (referring to the goat-sheep chimera as a “geep”). In contrast, if a hybrid goat-sheep
containing goat and sheep genes could interbreed with a goat, its offspring would be a
new, more goatish hybrid—a goap.
This difference, however, would mean that two fertile human-animal chimeras might
produce a genetically all-human child, which would make a chimera’s offspring even more
likely to create legal and ethical problems than a hybrid’s. Perhaps for this reason, the
National Academy of Sciences has cautioned against allowing human-animal chimeras to
reproduce if the modifications could affect their reproduction. HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM
CELL RESEARCH ADVISORY COMM., NAT’L ACADS., FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ACADE-
MIES’ HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND 2010 AMENDMENTS
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“geep,” a goat-sheep fusion that was created by combing early stage
goat and sheep embryos.27 When the combined embryo survived the
process, it developed into an animal having both goat and sheep cells
integrated into its body.28
Thus, a human-animal chimera is an organism that incorporates
both human and nonhuman cells. Xenotransplantation recipients,
such as humans with replacement heart valves from pigs, are human-
animal chimeras by this definition.29 For more difficult cases, the
human component of a human-animal chimera might be a human
embryo or human embryonic cells taken soon after fertilization. The
nonhuman chimera component might be an animal embryo, animal
embryonic cells, or perhaps an artificial cell incorporating some non-
human genes.30 Such chimeras could be created for research or per-
haps even for therapy if the animal cells could suppress the
expression, or gene-directed manifestation, of a hereditary disease in
a developing human embryo.
In contrast to a chimera, a hybrid is an organism that has substan-
tially the same genetic code in all of its cells, but its genetic code in-
cludes genes from at least two species.31 One very old example is the
TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES’ GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH
app. C § 7.5 (2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12923
[hereinafter NAT’L ACADS., FINAL REPORT].
27. Carole B. Fehilly et al., Intraspecific Chimaerism Between Sheep and Goat, 307 NATURE
634, 634 (1984); It’s a Geep, supra note 26, at 71.
28. Fehilly, supra note 27, at 634. The combined embryo frequently did not survive.
See id. at 636.
29. Cobbe & Wilson, supra note 22, at 177 (defining xenotransplants as “grafts of
animal cells or tissue into postnatal humans”). By this definition, at least one human-
animal chimera has served in the U.S. Senate: the late Senator Jesse Helms, whose replace-
ment heart valve was from a pig. See Jesse Helms Stable After Surgery, CBSNEWS (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-507219.html (describing the late Sen. Helms’ sec-
ond heart valve xenotransplantation). Human xenotransplantation recipients are a useful
test case for any proposed limit—or lack of limit—to the patentability of human-animal
fusions. But see Lauren Cirlin, Comment, Human or Animal: A Resolution to the Biotechnologi-
cal Blurring of the Lines, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 501, 508 (2003) (“[A] human cannot contain
animal parts.”).
30. The first artificial cell has already been created. Daniel G. Gibson et al., Creation of
a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically Synthesized Genome, 329 SCIENCE 52 (2010), available
at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/329/5987/52.full; Ewen Callaway, Immaculate Crea-
tion: Birth of the First Synthetic Cell, NEW SCIENTIST (May 20, 2010), http://www.newscientist.
com/article/dn18942-immaculate-creation-birth-of-the-first-synthetic-cell.html. A hybrid
could also be created with a new gene designed and constructed de novo by humans.
31. See Cobbe & Wilson, supra note 22, at 170–72 (distinguishing between chimera
and “subcellular mixtures” and describing various types of hybrids); see also Robert, supra
note 23, at 14 (discussing proposed Canadian legal definition of “chimera” and “hybrid”
embryos).
1084 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
mule, a hybrid created by breeding a male donkey with a female
horse.32 A more technologically demanding example of a hybrid is the
Harvard oncomouse (or OncoMouse®), a mouse genetically engi-
neered to incorporate an animal or human oncogene into its cells to
provide an animal model for cancer research.33 Unlike a chimera, a
fertile hybrid could transfer some of its modified genes to its descend-
ants through normal reproduction.34 Although human-animal chi-
mera and hybrids are biologically distinguishable, they raise similar
legal problems. For brevity, this Comment will use the portmanteau
term “human-animal fusion” or “fusion organism” to refer collectively
to both human-animal chimeras and hybrids.
B. A (Very) Brief History of Patentable Life
As the biological sciences have advanced, the area of patentable
subject matter has expanded to encompass living things.35 During the
nineteenth century, the USPTO viewed animals and plants as prod-
ucts of nature, and as such, unpatentable.36 Even human-directed
processes like plant breeding were not viewed as creating a patentable
invention, perhaps because of difficulties in reliably duplicating a liv-
ing invention or in fully describing its nature.37 This policy, however,
32. Cobbe & Wilson, supra note 22, at 173. More exotic hybrids include the liger,
which is produced by breeding a lion with a tigress. Id.
33. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 col. 2 ll. 15–21, col. 3 ll. 16–19 (filed June 22, 1984)
(describing and claiming the Harvard oncomouse); see also Kevin E. Noonan, Re-examina-
tion Ordered on “Expired” Harvard Oncomouse Patent, PAT. DOCS (June 11, 2010, 6:49 AM),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/06/reexamination-ordered-on-expired-harvard-
oncomouse-patent.html (citing the three patents of the oncomouse patent family).
34. See Cobbe & Wilson, supra note 22, at 172. Often, hybrids produced by interspe-
cies sexual reproduction are infertile because of genetic incompatibilities between the two
parents. See Norman A. Johnson, Hybrid Incompatibility and Speciation, SCITABLE (2008),
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/hybrid-incompatibility-and-speciation-820.
35. See generally, e.g., Hagglund, supra note 7, at 58–74 (providing a detailed historical
review of the patentability of living things); Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-
Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 443–48 (1999) (discussing pre-1999 animal
and chimera patents); Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double
Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV.
303, 313–21 (2002) (discussing the history of biotechnology patents, including chimera
patents); Brieanna Dolmage, Note, The Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter in the United
States, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 1023 (2006) (discussing the expansion of patentable subject
matter in response to technological advancement).
36. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311 (1980) (discussing the
USPTO’s pre-1930 reluctance to grant patents on plants).
37. See id. at 311–12.
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was not uniformly applied: in 1873, Louis Pasteur received a U.S. pat-
ent on purified yeast.38
After advances in genetics were more systemically applied to
plant breeding, Congress created a new class of patents that explicitly
provided patent protection for plant life. Under the 1930 Plant Patent
Act, new breeds of plants were patentable if their phenotype, or dis-
played traits, could be preserved by asexual reproduction.39 In 1970,
the Plant Variety Protection Act created certificates providing paten-
tlike protection to new varieties of sexually reproduced plants.40
However, the general patentability of nonplant organisms re-
mained uncertain. Despite Pasteur’s patent on yeast, neither plant
patent statute had specifically included microorganisms as patenta-
ble.41 Furthermore, a 1948 attempt to patent non-naturally occurring
mixtures of soil-enriching bacteria was rejected for trying to claim the
inherent properties of nature.42 If legislative action were necessary to
38. U.S. Patent No. 141,072, claim 2 (filed May 9, 1873) (claiming “[y]east, free from
organic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture”); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 314 & n.9
(citing Pasteur’s patent for yeast as evidence that the USPTO had issued previous “patents
on bacteria”). Here, Chakrabarty’s use of terminology was mistaken—yeast are not bacte-
ria—but the Pasteur patent still did provide a relevant precedent for the patentability of
microorganisms. Telephone Interview with Annette S. Parent, Partner, Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP (March 12, 2011) (explaining Chakrabarty’s error in equating yeast with bacte-
ria); THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 343, 878 (John Kendrew et al. eds., 1994)
(defining eukaryotes, which include all yeasts; and prokaryotes, which include all bacteria).
39. Plant Patent Act, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 161 (2006)) (providing the statutory basis for plant patents); J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 132–44 (2001) (discussing the history of plant
patents and plant variety protection certificates); Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 35, at
313–14 (same). Methods of plant asexual reproduction, such as propagating plants from
cuttings or spores, produce new plants that are genetically identical to their single parent,
while plant sexual reproduction produces new plants with genes from two parents. See, e.g.,
J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 132 (discussing plant asexual reproduction); THE ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF MOLECULAR BIOLOGY, supra note 38, at 69–70 (defining asexual reproduc-
tion); Asexual Reproduction, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
asexual+reproduction (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
40. Plant Variety Protection Act § 42, 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2006) (providing the statu-
tory basis for plant variety protection certificates); J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 138;
Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 35, at 313.
41. See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 35, at 313–16.
42. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculent Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–32 (1948) (holding
that the mixture of bacteria was new but not an invention). Rather than broadly rejecting
the patentability of bacteria, however, the Funk majority stressed the bacteria’s natural ori-
gin and the mixture’s reliance on the bacteria’s inherent properties for its advantages. See
id. at 130–32.
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extend patentability to plants, then perhaps legislative action would
be necessary to extend patentability to other living organisms.43
All this changed in 1980 with Diamond v. Chakrabarty.44 In
Chakrabarty, the plaintiff researcher attempted to secure a patent on a
genetically engineered oil-eating microorganism.45 The USPTO re-
jected the application,46 but in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme
Court held that microorganisms were patentable.47 Under the gov-
erning statute for patentable subject matter, genetically engineered
life was interpreted to fall into the statutory categories of “manufac-
ture or composition of matter.”48 In dicta, the Court suggested that
the categories of statutory subject matter include “anything under the
sun that is made by man.”49
Although Chakrabarty’s patent claimed a genetically engineered
bacterium, the decision provided no doctrinal basis for distinguishing
multicellular life.50 The USPTO did not attempt to construct one. The
1987 Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences decision Ex parte Allen
rejected claims to genetically engineered oysters but did not reject
them as improper subject matter.51 By implication, this decision rec-
ognized the patentability of multicellular animals. The USPTO soon
expressly stated its interpretation that all “nonnaturally occurring
non-human multicellular living organisms, including animals” were
statutory subject matter for patents.52
43. See J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 134–35 (asserting that Congress had
thought this in 1930 but was proven wrong with time); 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 1.02[7][d][iii] (2011) (discussing J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. 124).
44. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
45. Id. at 305–06.
46. Id. at 306.
47. See id. at 318.
48. Id. at 307, 309.
49. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2394, 2399) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. See generally Q. Todd Dickenson, Patentable Subject Matter: The Debate Reignites—Or
Did It Ever Really Go Away?, LANDSLIDE, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 30, 32–33 (providing a more
detailed account of the post-Chakrabarty USPTO statements regarding the patentability of
animals and humans). But see Comm’r of Patents v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,
2002 SCC 76, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 146–50 (Can.) (distinguishing between patentable “lower
life forms” and unpatentable “higher life forms,” such as the Harvard oncomouse).
51. Ex parte Allen, No. 86-1790, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1427–28 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 3,
1987) (holding that the claimed oysters were statutory subject matter but unpatentable for
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103); Dickenson, supra note 50, at 33. The Federal Circuit
affirmed the Board’s obviousness rejection in an unpublished opinion. In re Allen, 846
F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (unpublished table decision); see Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 923 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing the Federal Circuit’s decision).
52. Animals—Patentability, supra note 4.
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This policy statement provoked a legal challenge, but the
USPTO’s interpretation was upheld in Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Quigg.53 In Quigg, opponents of animal patentability asserted that the
statement was outside of the agency’s statutory authority.54 However,
the Federal Circuit held that the statement was only an interpretation
of existing law, not substantive law making,55 and that the policy’s
challengers lacked standing.56 The Court declined to consider the
propriety of the USPTO’s exclusion of humans from patentability.57
By both administrative and judicial authority, all bioengineered
animals were now statutory subject matter. All animals, that is, besides
humans. Under the USPTO’s policy, patent claims explicitly or implic-
itly including human beings in their scope would be rejected as unpat-
entable under the Constitution.58 Although the constitutional basis
for the prohibition was not explicitly stated, several commentators
have inferred that the USPTO relies upon the Thirteenth
Amendment.59
Despite this express policy against human patents, at least one
patent on mammalian cloning has been issued with broad claims that
do not exclude humans from their scope,60 although the assignee
stated that it would not use the methods to clone humans.61 As the
patent did not expressly claim humans, its issuance may merely re-
present an oversight during examination. However, it may indicate
that the USPTO’s unexpressed constitutional rationale distinguished
53. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 932 F.2d at 922.
54. Id. at 923–24.
55. Id. at 927–28.
56. Id. at 931.
57. Id. at 928 n.9.
58. Animals—Patentability, supra note 4.
59. See, e.g., Magnani, supra note 35, at 448 & n.45 (“The Commissioner did not spec-
ify the precise language in the Constitution that prohibits patenting human beings, but it
has been assumed that he was referring to the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on human
slavery.” (citing Elizabeth Joy Hecht, Note, Beyond Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg:
The Controversy over Transgenic Animal Patents Continues, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1023 n.1
(1992))); Dashka Slater, huMouse™ , LEGAL AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 20, 25 (“The basis for
this directive, [Quigg] said, was the Constitution—presumably the Thirteenth Amendment
ban on human slavery, which precludes treating human beings as property. Allowing some-
one to patent a person, the argument goes, is the same as allowing someone to own one.”);
Hagglund, supra note 7, at 66 & n.96 (citing Magnani, supra note 35, at 448 and Hecht,
supra, at 1024).
60. See U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 col. 21 ll. 21–30 (filed June 18, 1998); Slater, supra
note 59, at 26 (discussing the ’429 patent, which is assigned to the University of Missouri).
61. Slater, supra note 59, at 26 (“A university spokesman later told The Wall Street Jour-
nal that the institution opposed human cloning and would use its patent to prevent anyone
else from cloning humans.”).
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composition claims on humans, which are unpatentable, from
method claims on the artificial generation or bioengineering of
humans, which may have been considered patentable.62
The USPTO’s attitude toward patenting human-animal fusions
has been more permissive, for it has allowed patents on some fusion
organisms containing human genes. The Patent Office directly ad-
dressed the patentability of human-animal fusions in its response to
the Rifkin-Newman chimera application.63 In 1997, Jeremy Rifkin, an
antibiotechnology activist, and Stuart Newman, a biologist, applied for
a broad patent covering human-animal chimeras.64 They hoped to
force the USPTO either to declare human-animal chimeras unpatent-
able or to grant them a patent allowing them to block further chimera
research.65 The Patent Office’s Commissioner publically stated that
62. This Comment focuses on composition claims rather than method claims, as I see
no reasonable basis for a method being a legal person. However, allowing method patents
on humans creates the risk of the same unconstitutional uses as composition patents.
Consider a claim to a method of breathing for a novel, nonobvious human-animal
chimera, comprising the step of the chimera’s breathing. Breathing is an activity that is
well-known in the prior art, which makes it unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)
(the novelty requirement). But even a single novel, nonobvious element, such as the chi-
mera, renders an otherwise anticipated or obvious claim patentable. See U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2131, 2141 (8th ed. Rev.
8, July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/
mpep/index.htm (instructing examiners that for a claim to be anticipated, the prior art
must teach all claim elements, and that for a claim to be obvious, the invention as a whole
must be obvious to one of skill in the relevant art). Here, the applicant could argue that
the novel, nonobvious element—the chimera—would make the method patentable. If
such a claim were granted, its scope would be almost as broad as the analogous composi-
tion patent, for every chimera would need to use the method all the time to stay alive.
To avoid this problem, a method claim’s patentability should not rest entirely on a
novel, nonobvious organism if that organism were unpatentable on constitutional grounds.
Instead, the claim should require different, constitutionally permissible claim elements
that supported its patentability.
The AIA prohibits the grant of any new “claim directed to or encompassing a human
organism,” which seemingly would bar method patents claiming humans. Pub. L. No. 112-
29, § 33, 125 Stat. 288, 340 (2011) (applying the bar only to patents issued after the law’s
enactment). But because this law is directed to human organisms, not legal persons, it may
not block patents claiming only human-animal fusion organisms.
63. See Slater, supra note 59, at 22, 26–28 (providing a more detailed account of the
Rifkin-Newman application prerejection); Sea´n M. Coughlin, The Newman Application and
the USPTO’s Unnecessary Response: Patentability of Humans and Human Embryos, 5 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 90, 90–91 (2006) (criticizing the USPTO’s handling of the Newman
application).
64. Slater, supra note 59, at 22; Stuart A. Newman, My Attempt to Patent a Human-
Animal Chimera, L’OBSERVATOIRE DE LA GE´NE´TIQUE (Apr.–May 2006), http://www.omics-
ethics.org/observatoire/zoom/zoom_06/z_no27_06/za_no27_06_01.html (providing Dr.
Newman’s rationale for filing the application).
65. Slater, supra note 59, at 22.
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the claimed chimeras were unpatentable under the seldom-used mo-
rality clause of the utility requirement.66 Ultimately, however, the pat-
ent application’s examiner rejected it on multiple grounds, including
lack of novelty and lack of written description as well as nonstatutory
subject matter.67
Despite the rejection of the Rifkin-Newman application, U.S. pat-
ents on other fusion organisms with more limited human elements
have been issued. For example, the USPTO’s first animal patent was
for a mouse incorporating a human or animal oncogene.68 This hy-
brid mouse is perhaps an easy case: it incorporates only a small
amount of human genetic material, and its human oncogene is associ-
ated with cancer production rather than more humanlike qualities
like cognition or appearance.69 The patents’ issuance indicates that
the USPTO has implicitly adopted a more permissive policy for
human-animal fusion patents than for human patents, but the limits
of this policy are as yet undefined.
As was true after Ex parte Allen, the uncertainty represents an op-
portunity for the USPTO to present the reasoning behind its policies.
Among other things, this paper proposes that by using its administra-
tive authority to interpret the law,70 the USPTO can better explain the
Thirteenth Amendment support for its restriction on human patenta-
bility and provide more guidance to those researchers seeking patents
on human-animal fusions.
66. USPTO Media Advisory 98-6, supra note 5. The USPTO’s moral utility rationale is
controversial. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from
Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 282–83 (2000) (cautioning against the
Office’s use of moral utility as a patentability criterion). But see Margo A. Bagley, Patent
First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
469, 474 (2003) (arguing that a “patent first, ask questions later” approach to morally con-
troversial inventions is a bad policy).
67. U.S. Patent Application No. 08/993,564, Final Rejection from Deborah Crouch,
Primary Examiner, Aug. 2, 2004; see Hagglund, supra note 7, at 68–69 (discussing the
USPTO’s Final Rejection).
68. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (describing and claiming the
Harvard oncomouse).
69. See id. at col. 2 ll. 15–20, col. 8 ll. 48–49.
70. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927–28 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(discussing the USPTO’s authority to issue substantive and interpretive rules and holding
that the USPTO’s statement regarding the patentability of multicellular organisms was
merely interpretive).
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II. The Thirteenth Amendment Prohibits Patents on Human
Persons71
Currently, at least one statutory provision prevents the USPTO
from granting patents on humans. Under the Weldon Amendment,
the USPTO cannot use government funds to grant “patents on claims
directed to or encompassing a human organism.”72 The initial one-
year restriction was passed in 2004, but it has been intermittently re-
newed.73 Besides the Weldon Amendment, the 2011 Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (“AIA”) prohibits the issuance of any future pat-
ents “directed to or encompassing a human organism.”74 This law cre-
ated a more permanent, statutory barrier to both composition and
method claims on humans.
But these statutory barriers to human patentability are based on
Congress’ enumerated powers to control spending and to administer
the patent system.75 The Thirteenth Amendment presents an inde-
71. Esther Slater McDonald, Note, Patenting Human Life and the Rebirth of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1359, 1381–85 (2003) (arguing that patent rights over
humans would be equivalent to slavery). But see, e.g., Paul Lesko & Kevin Buckley, Attack of
the Clones . . . and the Issues of Clones, 3 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, at 35 (2002), http://
www.stlr.org/html/volume3/lesko.pdf (suggesting that because patents only confer a right
to exclude, a patent on human clones would not violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Dan
L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30 HOUS. L. REV.
1597, 1647–49 (1993) (arguing that because patents only confer a right to exclude, a
patent on humans would not violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Kevin D. DeBre´, Note,
Patents on People and the U.S. Constitution: Creating Slaves or Enslaving Science, 16 HASTINGS.
CONST. L.Q. 221, 231–32 (1989) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment allows patents
on human genotypes). Interestingly, although DeBre´ argues that human genotypes are
patentable, he asserts that the manufacture of human-animal hybrids would be an
unconstitutional subordination. Id. at 233–34.
72. Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammed, Can You Patent That? A Review of Subject Matter Eligi-
bility in Canada and the United States, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 269, 305 (2009) (quoting
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118 Stat. 3, 101 (2004)).
Crowne-Mohammed also argues that patents on human clones should be prohibited as
violations of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude, but pro-
vides no detailed justification. Id.
73. Hagglund, supra note 7, at 70–74 (discussing the Weldon Amendment in detail).
Note, however, that the USPTO’s rejection of the Rifkin-Newman chimera application did
quote the Weldon Amendment’s prohibition, even if this was not used as an explicit basis
for the rejection. See U.S. Patent Application No. 08/993,564, Final Rejection from
Deborah Crouch, Primary Examiner, Aug. 2, 2004, at 22.
74. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 288, 340 (2011) (barring patent claims “di-
rected to or encompassing a human organism,” but applying this bar only to patents issued
after the law’s enactment). This provision took effect on September 16, 2011. U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, AMERICA INVENTS ACT: EFFECTIVE DATES 2 (2011), available at http://
www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/aia-effective-dates.pdf.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (the Taxing and Spending Clause); U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8 (the Patent and Copyright Clause).
Spring 2012] PRESUMED SAPIENT 1091
pendent and more durable constitutional bar to patents on legal per-
sons, one that is based on their fundamental rights.76
A. The Thirteenth Amendment Forbids Private, Legally Enforced
Coercion of Labor77
Passed by the Radical Republicans at the end of the Civil War, the
Thirteenth Amendment was intended to end the chattel slavery of
76. The theme of this argument was foreshadowed in a dissent for Moore v. Regents of
the University of California, a California case dealing with the nonconsensual, commercial
use of a patient’s cells:
[O]ur society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to respect the human
body as the physical and temporal expression of the unique human persona. One
manifestation of that respect . . . is our prohibition against indirect abuse of the
body by its economic exploitation for the sole benefit of another person. The
most abhorrent form of such exploitation, of course, was the institution of slavery.
Lesser forms, such as indentured servitude or even debtor’s prison, have also dis-
appeared. Yet their specter haunts the laboratories and boardrooms of today’s
biotechnological research-industrial complex.
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 515 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(advocating that persons should have property rights in their “own bodies and its prod-
ucts,” such as the derived cell line claimed by the plaintiff and defendants).
The Thirteenth Amendment is likely not the only constitutional provision preventing
the patenting of legal persons. Under governing Fourteenth Amendment precedent,
human persons have a fundamental right to avoid state denial of their ability to procreate.
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S 535, 541 (1942). This suggests that the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause should also bar patenting of some fusion orga-
nisms and embryos. In reproduction, the parent’s genetic material is transmitted to a new
organism. If a patent claimed an organism or embryo bearing the same genetic material,
the patentee’s right to exclude could either bar a person from bearing children or subject
it to damages if it did. Such a ruling would be consistent with precedent only if fusion
organisms were not constitutional persons. See DeBre´, supra note 71, at 238–39 (after
presenting a similar analysis for human genotype patents, concluding “[t]o the extent they
infringed the procreation and privacy rights of anyone entitled to constitutional protec-
tions, current patent laws would be unconstitutional.”). DeBre´ asserted that a statutory
exemption for human parents could prevent this issue from ever arising. Id. at 239; see
Burk, supra note 71, at 1649–50 (arguing against reproductive rights as a bar to patentabil-
ity of transgenic humans and asserting that even if the patent right conflicted with repro-
ductive autonomy, the right would not destroy the entire patent grant); Hagglund, supra
note 7, at 89–90 (arguing that even if a patentee’s control of reproduction was foreclosed,
it would not destroy the entire scope of the patent right).
77. The Thirteenth Amendment has been urged as a way to create constitutional
rights against a surprising variety of social ills, such as racially motivated crimes and even
human cloning. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Epilogue: The Enduring Legacy of the
Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTINUING
RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 300, 302–03 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010)
[hereinafter THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY]; Sean Charles Vinck, Note, Does the Thirteenth
Amendment Provide a Jurisdictional Basis for a Federal Ban on Cloning?, 30 J. LEGIS. 183, 183
(2003). Perhaps because of concern about a principled limit to the amendment’s reach,
courts have generally not adopted these broader readings. But a broadened Thirteenth
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black Americans.78 Its text expressly prohibits slavery and nonpenal
involuntary servitude: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction.”79 The amendment provides Congress with broad
power to enforce this prohibition “by appropriate legislation.”80
The “involuntary servitude” prohibition was intended to prevent
the ex–Confederate States from establishing de facto slavery through
legal schemes for controlling former slaves’ labor.81 It prohibits the
types of control historically exercised by masters over their slaves’ la-
bor as opposed to their hired servants. But by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s express use of “person” without qualification, its protection
applies to all persons, not only to historically enslaved groups.82 Be-
cause the amendment’s wording was not limited to former slaves or
racial minorities, it has provided a basis for laws against other nongov-
ernmental schemes of involuntary servitude, such as peonage83 and
human trafficking.84 The Supreme Court has upheld this all-person
reading in its rulings upholding the constitutionality of the Anti-Peon-
age Law.85
Amendment should provide at least the same level of protection as the narrower
interpretations relied upon in this Comment.
78. Records of congressional debates over the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification
suggest that both its proponents and opponents alike believed that its ratification would
not only eliminate slavery, but also guarantee at least some rights to ex-slaves. See ALEXAN-
DER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY 37–48
(2004).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
80. Id. § 2. Because regulating the patent system is already among Congress’ enumer-
ated powers, here the Thirteenth Amendment would limit the operation of the Patent and
Copyright Clause rather than provide an independent power of congressional action. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
81. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). Despite the Thirteenth
Amendment, the ex-Confederate States quickly passed the Black Codes, which severely re-
stricted the freedom of former slaves. William M. Wiecek, Emancipation and Civic Status: The
American Experience, 1865–1915, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 77, at 78, 84–86
(discussing the Black Codes). In response, Congress enacted other statutory and constitu-
tional measures protecting the rights of ex-slaves, including the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 86–88.
82. See, e.g., Bailey, 219 U.S. at 240–41 (“While the immediate concern was with Afri-
can slavery, the [Thirteenth] Amendment was not limited to that. It was a charter of uni-
versal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color or estate, under the flag.”).
83. TSESIS, supra note 78, at 154–57.
84. Id. at 157–58 (discussing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, a law that targeted human trafficking).
85. Id. at 156–57.
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More recently, a definition of “involuntary servitude” has been
explicitly set forth in the 1988 Supreme Court decision United States v.
Kozminski.86 In Kozminski, the defendant coerced two “mentally re-
tarded” men to work on his farm.87 Because of a dispute between
lower courts about the type of coercion required to place persons in
involuntary servitude, the Supreme Court considered what sort of co-
ercion could justify criminal prosecution under a law forbidding invol-
untary servitude.88 The Court held that because the wording of the
Thirteenth Amendment explicitly excluded punishment for crimes
from its ban, “the term ‘involuntary servitude’ necessarily means a
condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the
defendant by . . . the use or threat of coercion through law or the
legal process.”89 Therefore, purely legal coercion can be sufficient to
produce involuntary servitude under the statute.
Soon after the Thirteenth Amendment’s adoption, the Supreme
Court also interpreted the Amendment’s scope to include a prohibi-
tion of the “badges and incidents of slavery,” which include the loss of
civil rights that was associated with chattel slavery.90 In the Civil Rights
Cases, the plaintiffs sued under a federal law prohibiting racial dis-
crimination in certain businesses serving the public, such as inns, the-
aters, and railroads.91 The law was held to be an unconstitutional
restraint on private action.92 In its decision, however, the Court de-
scribed many legal features of slavery that were forbidden by the Thir-
teenth Amendment:
Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master, re-
straint of his movements except by the master’s will, disability to
hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, to be
a witness against a white person, and such like burdens and inca-
pacities were the inseparable incidents of the institution. . . . [For-
mer slaves now have] those fundamental rights which are the
essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and en-
force contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit,
86. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
87. See id. at 934–35.
88. Id. at 937–39.
89. Id. at 952.
90. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
91. Id. at 4–5.
92. Id. at 24–26. Because both the Thirteenth Amendment’s proponents and adversa-
ries understood its scope as including other civil rights, this decision has been criticized as
a rejection of the Thirteenth Amendment’s original intent. See, e.g., TSESIS, supra note 78,
at 72–74.
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purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens.93
Therefore, the Court’s first list of “badges and incidents” included la-
bor services compelled without a bargained exchange, control of
travel, and the inability to make contracts.
The scope of the Civil Rights Cases’ badges and incidents of slavery
was narrowly construed in the now-overturned case Hodges v. United
States.94 In Hodges, the defendants appealed their conviction for intim-
idating black workers to break their work contracts.95 The Court held
that it had no jurisdiction over the case96 because the Thirteenth
Amendment applied only to slavery and involuntary servitude, which
the Court defined as “a condition of enforced compulsory service of
one to another.”97 Extending the amendment’s prohibition to slav-
ery’s “badges and incidents” would allegedly be inconsistent with the
amendment’s facial meaning, later statutory precedent, and the citi-
zenship of ex-slaves.98 This narrowing of the badges and incidents of
slavery seemingly restricted the Thirteenth Amendment’s scope to
government action that coerces a person to provide labor for another
person.
The broader, currently controlling reading of the badges and in-
cidents of slavery was set forth in the 1968 case Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.99 In Jones, an interracial married couple sued for the right to buy a
house whose owners refused to sell solely because the husband was
black.100 In upholding the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s prohibition of pri-
vate housing discrimination, the Court affirmed the law’s justification
under the Thirteenth Amendment, stating that Congress had both
the power to define what a “badge” was and to pass any law necessary
93. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22.
94. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), overruled by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Although this decision’s narrow interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment is no longer binding law, it shows that patents on human persons would vio-
late even a narrower interpretation than the currently prevailing one.
95. Id. at 2–4.
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 16.
98. See id. at 16–20.
99. Jones, 392 U.S. 409. See generally Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’
Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
77, 134–35 (2010) (describing the “broad approach” of Jones).
100. Jones, 392 U.S. at 412; McAward, supra note 99, at 94.
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to eliminate it.101 In the cases following Jones, the courts have consist-
ently upheld legislation based on the Thirteenth Amendment.102
The recent Fourteenth Amendment decision City of Boerne v. Flo-
res, which limited Congress’ power to expand state civil rights by fed-
eral enforcement legislation,103 suggests that the modern Court might
not reaffirm the full scope of Jones.104 But a patent on a human person
would violate the Thirteenth Amendment even under the narrower
holdings of the Civil Rights Cases or Hodges.
B. Patents on Humans Would Allow Private Coercion of Their
Labor and Activities
Even if narrowly construed, the Thirteenth Amendment forbids
systems of involuntary, government-enforced private control over an-
other person’s labor.105 To understand why this would prohibit pat-
ents on humans, however, we must review some general properties of
patents.
A patent confers a right to exclude others from practicing the
invention described by the patent’s claims.106 Typically, this right lasts
from the patent’s issuance to twenty years from the patent applica-
tion’s filing.107 Without a license from the patent owner, or patentee,
use of or inducement to use the invention is an infringement of the
101. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439–40; McAward, supra note 99, at 95.
102. See McAward, supra note 99, at 97 & n.109 (asserting and supporting the claim:
“Since Jones, federal courts have upheld at least seven statutes challenged on Thirteenth
Amendment grounds and struck down none.”).
103. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (holding that Congress can
use its Fourteenth Amendment power only to enforce rights, not to expand them).
104. See McAward, supra note 99, at 77. Because its holding applies to the Fourteenth
Amendment, City of Boerne does not overtly contradict Jones, but City of Boerne limits Con-
gress’ ability to expand a constitutional right’s scope by “enforcing” it broadly, while Jones
gives Congress broad power both to define and to enforce Thirteenth Amendment rights.
See id. at 79–82.
105. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906) (defining slavery and involun-
tary servitude), overruled by Jones, 392 U.S. 409; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911)
(“The plain intention [of the Thirteenth Amendment] was to abolish slavery of whatever
name and form and all its badges and incidents; to render impossible any state of bondage;
to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is
disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit[,] which is the essence of involuntary
servitude.”).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). A patent provides no positive right to practice a
patented invention. See id. Thus, a patentable improvement to another inventor’s patented
invention could incorporate the patented invention as a claim element.
107. Id. § 154(a)(2).
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patent.108 If infringement can be established, the legal standard for
infringement damages requires at least a reasonable royalty, but the
court will often also issue an injunction prohibiting the infringing
activities.109
Under current United States law, a patent requires a written
description of the claimed invention.110 This written description
marks the outer bounds of the invention, providing notice to others
of what was invented,111 while the patent claims define the boundaries
of the patentee’s property right.112 Just as in patents claiming geneti-
cally engineered animals, the written description and claims of a
human-animal fusion patent would be expressed in qualitative terms
describing an organism (e.g., “a goat-sheep chimera”), though it likely
would also define at least one novel biological feature in more detail.
For example, a patent that claims “a mouse carrying the human
oncogene X” would likely include a complete genetic description of
the oncogene X.
A patent on a person’s body or in vivo genetic composition113
would allow the patentee to prohibit the body’s use by any unlicensed
person.114 Because the patent right to exclude “use” of an invention
108. Id. § 271(a)–(b). Other activities, such as making or selling the invention, will also
infringe the patent. Id.
109. See id. §§ 283–284 (providing the standards for injunctive relief and damages);
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006) (discussing the standard
for injunctive relief).
110. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
111. Id.; see also Ariad Pharm. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (af-
firming the requirement for written description); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (setting forth the requirement for written description).
112. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; KIEFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 866 (discussing how the claims
define the right to exclude).
113. If a genetically engineered, patentable cell or gene did not occur in nature, its
composition of matter could be claimed even in vivo. See supra Part II.B; Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (“Congress thus recognized that the relevant dis-
tinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature,
whether living or not, and human-made inventions.”). If such a patented composition were
incorporated into a person’s body, the patentee could likely use the patent right to coerce
the person’s actions much as a patent to the person’s body as a whole. But see DeBre´, supra
note 71, at 231–32 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment allows patents on human
genotypes).
114. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1); Andrew W. Torrance, Physiological Steps Doctrine, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1471, 1500–01, 1503, 1505 n.213 (2008) (arguing that case law regard-
ing in vivo metabolism of drugs indicates an implicit prohibition on patenting “products of
human physiological processes” and mentioning the Thirteenth Amendment as a possible
justification). But see DeBre´, supra note 71, at 231–32 (arguing that the recipient of a pat-
ented genotype would have an implied license once the genotype was “sold”). Perhaps
such an implied license would protect purchaser/recipients of patented organs, but how
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includes its employment for commerce or other economic activity,115
this right would effectively provide the patentee with exclusive control
over the patented person’s labor.116 Any unlicensed employer would
commit patent infringement because the work performed for them by
the patented person would involve the use of a patented composition:
the person’s body. This would allow the patentee to define the condi-
tions of the patented person’s employment. To avoid patent infringe-
ment and the accompanying legal penalties, the patented person
could work only for a licensed employer under whatever terms that
the patentee would set.
Even more problematic, the patented person would need a li-
cense to take any action without incurring liability. Exercising a pat-
ent’s exclusionary right does not require positive ownership over a
particular physical embodiment of the invention, or patents would be
unenforceable.117 A patent would not grant positive title to a patented
person’s body as such. Instead, a patent on a person’s body would
subject that person to the patentee’s right to prohibit the patented
invention’s unlicensed use, even by a person who would otherwise
have positive ownership or control of the patented property. But per-
sons use their bodies—which are either themselves or at least a legally
significant part of themselves—whenever they act.118 Even purely
mental deliberation involves some detectible physiological activity
would it apply to genetically engineered humans produced without a sale to the recipients
or with a sale under an expressly limited license?
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). Were it otherwise, a patent would provide very weak
protection for commercialization of inventions.
116. See McDonald, supra note 71, at 1385 (equating the patentee’s right to exclude
others from selling a patented invention as preventing patented persons from exercising
their right to make employment contracts). Although McDonald correctly identifies the
unconstitutionality of allowing a patentee to overrule a patented person’s liberty of con-
tract, she also asserts that a patent would confer a positive right to contract out a patented
person’s labor. Id. But a patent provides no positive right to use: it only provides the right
to exclude. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
117. Positive ownership of property typically provides a right to exclude. See, e.g., CUN-
NINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, at 1–6 (discussing the concept and elements of property);
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 90–91 (discussing the right to exclude and its limita-
tions). If a patentee could only enforce patent rights on physical embodiments that the
patentee owned, the patent right to exclude would largely be redundant.
118. The philosophical debate of whether a person’s nature is characterized by some-
thing other than a body is outside the scope of this Comment. All that is necessary to this
argument is that a particular physical body’s externally uncoerced movements and activi-
ties express the acts of a particular legal person.
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within a person’s brain (e.g., a use of the brain). Thus, if a person’s
body is patented, the person necessarily uses the patented material.119
Although it might seem that most activities of a patented person
would not economically harm the patentee, this would not apply to
any productive labor. A patented person’s labor would produce eco-
nomic value accruing to the employer and the patented person rather
than the patentee. In any case, infringement of the patentee’s right to
exclude provides a sufficient justification for damages and often an
injunction as well.120 Were it otherwise, the patent right would be
empty. This right would give the patentee a legal veto over the pat-
ented human’s actions: the patentee could deter undesired actions by
the threat of infringement damages or injunctive prohibitions.
This degree of control over another person’s actions would vio-
late the Thirteenth Amendment. The patented persons would have
no option to avoid using their bodies, so they would have no power to
avoid the patentee’s right to exclude. They would have to take a li-
cense for the patent’s term or be liable for infringement.121 Under
current law, the patentee has wide discretion to set the terms of a
patent license, including a requirement to use the patented materi-
als—the person’s body—only in transactions with a particular com-
pany or companies.122 A license could even be limited to a particular
119. This argument primarily applies to composition of matter or manufacture claims
directed to a human person, but may be inapplicable to method claims unless they are so
broad that they would apply to all or most of the patented person’s actions. See supra note
62.
120. eBay Inc., v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006) (holding that
the traditional four-factor test for injunctions applies to patent cases). eBay sets forth the
currently governing standard, which usually (but not always) allows for an injunction
against the infringer. See, e.g., id. at 394–95 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ.,
concurring). Even if the four-factor test weighed against injunction, however, this would
not prevent a patentee from seeking a reasonable royalty for use of the patented body. See
35 U.S.C. § 284 (“[Damages can be] in no event less than a reasonable royalty . . . .”).
121. The limited term of the patent grant and the length of time for human matura-
tion suggest that many patented humans would be minors, who might not have the ability
to consent to a licensing agreement. Even so, minors have no statutory immunity from
infringement liability. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (defining direct infringement). If the pat-
ented person’s age were to provide some protection, infringement liability still would af-
fect any nonpatentee adult guardian or third party interacting with the patented minor.
122. A possible alternative strategy for dealing with this problem would be to require
issuance of a mandatory license to the patented person. Cf. DeBre´, supra note 71, at 231–32
(arguing that the recipient of a patented genotype would have an implied license). Per-
haps this could be effective in circumventing the overt Thirteenth Amendment problem,
but it would require a test to know when this mandatory license would be necessary. Trans-
fer of the patent’s exclusionary right from the patentee to the patented persons might also
represent a regulatory taking unless the patentee received some compensation for the loss
of value.
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field of use, such as a particular industry or even a specific job. Al-
though these licensing terms would be broadly limited by contract,
labor, and employment laws, the core principle of the license would
still be disposition of the patented person’s labor or activities without
the need for consent at any stage. Such control over a person’s labor
and other actions would be a form of coercion enforced by the threat
of civil damages or injunction, which would satisfy the definition of
involuntary servitude used in Kozminski. Therefore, because allowing
patents on human persons would yield a result forbidden by the Thir-
teenth Amendment, human persons must be unpatentable under the
Constitution.123
Some commentators argue that because a patent provides neither
title to a patented creature nor any positive right to use patented sub-
ject matter, it cannot infringe the Thirteenth Amendment.124 Suppos-
edly, because the patent only conveys a negative right to exclude
persons from using the patented subject matter, it prevents indirect
control based on infringement liability “because the subject matter of
a patent cannot infringe its own patent.”125 But this assumption of
noninfringement is unjustified. Neither statute nor case law explicitly
123. Certain commentators have argued that human embryos or fetuses are or should
be patentable. See, e.g., Jonathan Grossman, Comment, Human Embryos, Patents, and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 731, 733 (2007) (arguing that the Thirteenth
Amendment does not apply to human embryos). But see McDonald, supra note 71, at 1362
(arguing that given the circumstances of its passage, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
all ownership of humans, including human embryos). The AIA’s prohibition of new claims
“directed to or encompassing a human organism” bars any future patents on human em-
bryos and fetuses. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 288, 340 (2011) (applying this prohi-
bition only to patents issued after the law’s enactment).
The legal status of part-human embryos and fetuses, however, is still unresolved.
Under current abortion-rights precedents, embryos are only “life or potential life,” not
constitutional persons. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852, 870
(1992) (describing the developing infant as “life or potential life”). Debating the correct-
ness of this holding is outside this Comment’s scope. However, the positive governmental
interests supporting patent protection for embryonic research in chimera and hybrids—
promoting scientific research and possibly advancing human health—are different from
(and weaker than) the government interest in preventing state interference with a funda-
mental right, which the Casey Court stated was the basis for the abortion-rights holdings
(along with stare decisis). Id. at 851–53. This difference could allow courts to distinguish
embryo patenting from the abortion-rights decisions.
124. E.g., Hagglund, supra note 7, at 86–89.
125. See Grossman, supra note 123, at 765 (asserting that a patented human embryo
would “need no shielding from actions of infringement because the subject matter of a
patent cannot infringe its own patent.”); Bagley, supra note 66, at 502 (asserting that the
patent’s exclusionary right would not allow patentees to coerce actions); see also Lesko &
Buckley, supra note 71, at 35 (claiming that because patents only confer a right to exclude,
they are not equivalent to human ownership or slavery).
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provides the subject of a patent with immunity from infringement.
Historically, patented inventions have not been natural or corporate
persons, and as nonpersons, they could not be sued for infringe-
ment.126 Without an explicit basis for immunity, however, the pat-
ented human person would be subject to the same legal obligations as
other legal persons, including liability for infringement. Unless pat-
ented humans were ruled nonpersons—a legal status that would open
the door to abuses even worse than involuntary servitude—they would
lack the immunity from suit that an integrated circuit or a genetically
engineered carrot enjoys.
A second argument put forth in favor of human patentability is
that although coercive uses of human patents would be unconstitu-
tional, this limitation would not bar the patent itself, but only bar the
patent’s misuse.127 Such a position is mistaken because it wrongly fo-
cuses on an owner’s misuse of a property right rather than the nature
of the right itself. Because the Thirteenth Amendment is an “absolute
bar” against involuntary servitude, the opportunity to use a patent’s
property right in a person to create involuntary servitude through le-
gal coercion is a signal of the property right’s facial conflict with the
Thirteenth Amendment.128 Even the kindest and most humane mas-
ters lost their ability to have slaves and bondservants because of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Suppose that a lax or absentee master al-
lowed his indentured servants the full range of freedoms allowed to
free laborers, but still retained his legal title to their labor. Regardless
of the servants’ de facto freedom, the Thirteenth Amendment would
still prohibit the indentured servitude itself because their freedom
would only be at the landowner’s sufferance.129
126. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (stating “whoever” violates the patent’s exclusionary
right is an infringer). Among other reasons, if nonpersons could be sued for infringement,
it would create absurd results regarding the separate liability of machines or tools that were
used in practicing a patented process. Would my computer need to pay a separate royalty if
I used it to infringe a software patent?
127. See Hagglund, supra note 7, at 89–90 (analogously arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive due process rights to privacy and reproductive autonomy would
not prevent the patentability of human-animal chimeras).
128. See McDonald, supra note 71, at 1383–84 (making a similar argument with the
premise that the Thirteenth Amendment bans all chattelism or any property right in a
human).
129. Id. at 1384 (discussing an analogous hypothetical involving slaves).
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C. Are Human-Animal Fusions Persons Under the Thirteenth
Amendment?
Even if we accept persons to be per se unpatentable, this proposi-
tion will only affect the patentability of human-animal fusions if they
also are persons under the Thirteenth Amendment. But are these
creatures persons? The Constitution does not explicitly define the cri-
teria for legal personhood in its articles or amendments. A considera-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment’s original meaning, however,
provides some guidance in answering this question.
Given the level of biotechnology in the 1860s, the Amendment
was not, of course, deliberately designed to grant legal personhood to
human-animal fusions. Instead, the Amendment was designed to end
slavery and its related abuses.130 For many of their congressional pro-
ponents, the broader purpose of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments was also to elevate a subordinated racial group
with limited constitutional rights to de jure political equality with the
dominant race.131 Both the Amendment’s proponents and its oppo-
nents expressed this understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
meaning in the debates surrounding its ratification.132 Indeed, in the
Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court described the Thirteenth
Amendment as “establishing and decreeing universal civil and politi-
cal freedom throughout the United States.”133
In the decades since its adoption, the Thirteenth Amendment
has been consistently applied to other racial groups, even those that
had no history of slavery and who were otherwise discriminated
against in the late–nineteenth century, such as Chinese immigrants.134
130. See generally TSESIS, supra note 78, at 37–48 (examining the congressional debates
on the Thirteenth Amendment’s meaning and purpose).
131. See id. at 40; Wiecek, supra note 81, at 86–88 (discussing the intended legal effect
of the Amendments to protect the civil rights of ex-slaves). Insofar as the Thirteenth
Amendment’s original public meaning was to grant equal legal rights to “inferior” races—
that is, the more that its original public meaning was influenced by racist or racialist rank-
ings of human subgroups—the better the argument that the provisions’ original public
meaning should extend personhood to “inferior” part-humans with lower capacity than an
average human.
132. See Tsesis, supra note 78, at 37–48.
133. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
134. William J. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges
and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1356 n.160, 1357–61 (2007) (describing
prior applications of the Thirteenth Amendment to protect other racial groups). But see id.
at 1356 n.160 (discussing limits to application of the Thirteen Amendment to curtail pri-
vate racial discrimination: “Overly creative interpretations of the Amendment that pay little
attention to its actual history and context can result in cases and scholarship diminishing
the Amendment rather than strengthening it.”).
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Even in Hodges, the Court’s analysis stated that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s applicability did not depend on a person’s race:
It reaches every race and every individual, and if in any respect it
commits one race to the Nation it commits every race and every
individual thereof. Slavery or involuntary servitude of the Chinese,
of the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon are as much within its compass as
slavery or involuntary servitude of the African.135
This understanding strongly implies that the Thirteenth Amendment
was and still should be broadly applicable to other groups distin-
guished by their national origin, ancestry, or physiological features.
Although the Thirteenth Amendment’s original meaning applies
broadly to humans of different races, this is not sufficient to deter-
mine the issue regarding human-animal fusions. A race is not a spe-
cies. Insofar as a human race is a true biological category at all,136 it is
closest to a subspecies with an indistinct boundary. The Thirteenth
Amendment’s “universal liberty” was applied to enslaved humans, not
to horses in their stables or chickens in their coop, suggesting that the
Amendment’s original meaning distinguished between human per-
sons, who were freed, and animal nonpersons, which remained the
135. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906), overruled by Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
136. In general, subspecies have biological features that more sharply distinguish their
members as different from other creatures of the species, while the biological features of
human “races” are more like a continuum lacking clear lines of demarcation. See, e.g.,
PETER H. RAVEN & GEORGE B. JOHNSON, BIOLOGY 406–07, 420–21 (1986) (defining subspe-
cies, but cautioning that human “races” are hard to characterize by particular combina-
tions of racial traits). Because of this fact, and likely because of the many abuses associated
with racial classifications, the American Anthropological Association has stated that for
humans, the category “race” is an “arbitrary and subjective” classification scheme. American
Anthropological Association Statement on “Race,” AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N (May 17, 1998),
http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm. Given that racial groups are in some cases cor-
related with observable physiological traits, such as different incidences of particular he-
reditary diseases (e.g., sickle-cell anemia), this view may go too far in denying any
biological basis to the category. Learning About Sickle Cell Disease, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME
RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/10001219 (last updated Oct. 25, 2011) (sickle cell ane-
mia is most prevalent among African Americans with one in twelve being carriers of the
sickle cell trait).
But more importantly, for identifying the Amendments’ original public meaning,
what their enactors believed about race is more important than whether those beliefs were
scientifically correct. At the time of the Thirteenth Amendment’s enactment in 1865, con-
ceptions of black slaves as biologically different in kind from—and inferior to—their white
masters were common. See, e.g., American Anthropological Association Statement on “Race,”
supra. This historical context of racial prejudice is deplorable on many grounds, but it
strengthens the argument that the Thirteenth Amendment’s original public meaning man-
dates the extension of personhood to genetically different, “inferior” species that have the
properties characteristic of legal persons.
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property of their masters.137 Thus, although the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s text and history suggest that it should apply to any person in
servitude, its applicability to particular cases turns on the criteria for
personhood implicit in American law.
III. The Properties of a Constitutional Person Can Be
Inferred from Existing Law
Merely recognizing that criteria for personhood are implied in
the law does not automatically reveal their fundamental nature or
even guarantee that consistent, universally applicable legal criteria ex-
ist. However, it does suggest a procedure for identifying whatever stan-
dards that should apply. Proposed criteria for personhood can be
compared with existing law to test if the proposed standard would
yield results matching the current, implied standard. If the proposed
criteria’s results were to differ from the law significantly in some re-
spect, it would be a signal to reject the criteria as a bad fit. Alterna-
tively, if the new results were to seem more reasonable than existing
law, it would be a motive to change the law to institute the new
criteria.
A. Is Self-Awareness Necessary and Sufficient for Legal
Personhood?
At least one commentator, Michael Rivard, has proposed a single
criterion as “necessary and sufficient” for constitutional personhood:
self-awareness.138 Self-awareness is often defined as self-consciousness,
the knowledge of oneself as an object as well as a subject.139 This com-
mon definition, however, is a weak self-awareness, not the stronger
version that Rivard advocates. Following Daniel Dennett and Harry
Frankfurt, Rivard defines strong self-awareness more narrowly as pos-
sessing “second-order volition,” or the quality of desiring to have dif-
137. See Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World
Parks & Entm’t, Inc., No. 11cv2476 JM(WMC), 2012 WL 399214, at **3–5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2012) (discussing textual indications why the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition does
not apply to animals). The Tilikum court takes a strong stand against granting animals
rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, but does not consider the possibility of novel
part-human creatures. See id.
138. Rivard, supra note 21, at 1488.
139. See, e.g., Self-Conscious, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
self-consciousness (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (defining the relevant sense of “self-conscious”
as “conscious of oneself or one’s own being”).
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ferent “preferences and purposes.”140 Rivard argues that this strong
self-awareness will allow a creature to understand, and presumably to
desire, the constitutional interests of liberty and autonomy.141 If some
members of a species display this quality, then all the species’ mem-
bers should be granted constitutional personhood.142
Weak self-awareness has some plausibility as a criterion for legal
personhood, as self-consciousness seems a necessary precondition for
perceiving ourselves as beings with legal rights and duties. Strong self-
awareness has the added benefit of providing an explicit basis for a
person’s understanding of some legal interests, as well as being a qual-
ity so far only identified in humans.143 But an application of these
definitions to existing law shows that neither weak nor strong self-
awareness is a sufficient criterion for defining legal personhood as
currently embodied in the law.
The first, weaker definition of self-awareness—self-consciousness,
or the knowledge of oneself as an entity—is overbroad to serve as the
definition for legal personhood. It would grant personhood to any
self-conscious creature, but the law currently does not. For example,
chimpanzees seem to be self-aware under this weaker definition.
When a chimpanzee that has been familiarized with a mirror is
marked on its face, it will use the mirror to examine the mark.144
Chimpanzees unfamiliar with a mirror, however, do not check their
reflections, nor do other monkeys even if they have been familiarized
with a mirror. This self-recognition indicates a chimpanzee’s identifi-
cation of its reflection with its body or “self.” Elephants and dolphins
also seem to have this capacity for mirror self-recognition.145 But these
140. Rivard, supra note 21, at 1486. Rivard contrasts this with “first-order volition,”
which is the quality of desiring an object or experience. See id. (noting Dennett and Frank-
furt’s definition of first- and second-order volition as discussed in DANIEL C. DENNETT, Con-
ditions of Personhood, in Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology 267,
283–85 (MIT Press 1981) (1978) and Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept
of a Person, in WHAT IS A PERSON? 127, 128–29 (Michael F. Goodman ed., 1988)). Those
without second-order volition include children, the mentally impaired, and nonhuman
animals. Id. (quoting Frankfurt’s characterization of these groups as “wantons”).
141. Id. at 1487. A lawyer’s proposal that the conscious understanding of legal interests
is the essential capacity for legal personhood perhaps invites skepticism, but its strength is
in linking personhood with the appreciation of legal rights and duties necessary to respect
the interests of other persons.
142. See id. at 1488.
143. Id. at 1486.
144. MARCO IACOBONI, MIRRORING PEOPLE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HOW WE CONNECT
WITH OTHERS 136–38 (2008) (describing the mirror experiments set forth in Gordon G.
Gallup, Jr., Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition, 167 SCIENCE 86 (1970)).
145. Id. at 139–40.
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animals are not considered legal persons.146 Therefore, weak self-
awareness cannot be a sufficient criterion for legal personhood,
though it may be some evidence supporting a creature’s legal
personhood.
Though mere self-consciousness is too broad, the more narrow
definition of strong self-awareness—second-order volition—also has
some difficulties as a criterion. First, the apparent simplicity of the
criterion fails in actual cases because its identification depends on a
creature’s capacity—and willingness—for communication. Humans
can often communicate their second-order volitions through lan-
guage. Without a common language, the second-order desire for a
different nature would be hard to detect unambiguously. Even if sec-
ond-order volition prompted a creature’s actions, the intent to pro-
duce a change in one’s being though the actions would be hard to
distinguish from the intent to perform the actions themselves.
For example, consider two runners who follow the same training
regimen. The first runner simply enjoys running (a first-order voli-
tion), while the second enjoys running, but is also trying to build en-
durance for another activity (a second-order volition). Both runners
would exhibit similar behavior: they would both run and seem to en-
joy running. An observer would have trouble distinguishing the two
runners’ motives by their actions alone, as their shared first-order voli-
tion would provide a sufficient rationale for their behavior. To iden-
tify the runner with second-order volition, it would be easiest—and
perhaps even necessary—to ask the runners about their motives.
But if a fusion organism could communicate fluently enough to
express second-order volition, it would be more capable than young
children and some mentally disabled adults, all of whom are legal per-
sons. Without some demonstration that the capacity to possess volition
necessarily produces the capacity to express the volition in language, a
test for strong self-awareness would in practice test both communica-
tion and self-awareness. If a creature were less sophisticated at com-
munication than cognition, how could a reasonable observer reliably
apply the test?
Second, even if strong self-awareness could be tested without rely-
ing on language, the criterion would still be overnarrow. Many legal
146. See, e.g., Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea
World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., No. 11cv2476 JM(WMC), 2012 WL 399214, at *5 (S.D. Cal.
Feb. 8, 2012) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment only applies to humans, not or-
cas); Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying standing for
cetaceans to sue).
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persons do not seem self-aware in this sense at all. For example, under
governing precedent a human is legally recognized as a person at
birth,147 which seems to precede self-awareness of either sort. And
even in cases of dementia or severe brain damage with no hope of
recovery, a human person may not be actively euthanized by a legal
guardian, while a nonperson, such as a dog, can be killed by its
owner.148 Instead, only the withholding of lifesaving medical treat-
ment is legally permissible, and it generally requires evidence of the
patient’s wish to decline treatment, even if the patient were no longer
capable of expressing it.149
Rivard attempts to fix this apparent problem with the criterion by
extending constructive personhood to infants and children because of
their social value to strongly self-aware persons, a value that he de-
scribes as “social cohesion within a species.”150 However, this implies
that the personhood of children and other creatures without strong
self-awareness is contingent on others’ interest or a societal interest
rather than any intrinsic quality. In a society that did not value them,
completely unwanted children or mentally impaired adults presuma-
bly should not be legal persons, as they would lack any interested
party or group to provide them with social value. In such a society, the
painless killing of unwanted children or the mentally impaired should
logically be permissible, as no genuinely self-aware person would be
147. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158–62 (1973) (excluding the unborn from consti-
tutional personhood, but not newborn infants: “[T]he word ‘person,’ as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”). However, the law does recognize
certain rights even before birth. For example, many states have historically allowed a prop-
erty right to vest before birth, though the right would not be perfected until live birth. Id.
at 162 (referring to inheritance rights of the unborn); John P. Wilson, Fetal Experimentation:
Legal Implications of an Ethical Conundrum, 53 DENV. L.J. 581, 596 & nn.66, 69 (1976). In
many states, attacks on pregnant women causing late-term miscarriage can be prosecuted
as homicide. See id. at 597–98. See generally Wilson, supra (discussing the legal status of the
fetus in utero); Gregory J. Roden, Unborn Children as Constitutional Persons, 25 ISSUES L. &
MED. 185 (2010) (discussing legal precedents for prebirth personhood in an attack on Roe
v. Wade).
148. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (rejecting arguments
for a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide). The legal personhood of the de-
mented and dying further suggests that legal personhood is durable. For example, an eld-
erly man with advanced Alzheimer’s disease loses the ability to act purposefully, to speak,
and eventually to move his body in voluntary action. This mental degeneration slowly strips
away the qualities that we normally associate with a person. Despite this loss, his legal per-
sonhood will endure until death. He may be declared incompetent, but he is never de-
clared an object. This suggests that it should be impossible to “unperson” a living creature
who is legally recognized as a person.
149. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
150. Rivard, supra note 21, at 1489.
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directly harmed. Ignoring for a moment the moral problems with
such a result, it flatly contradicts governing law.151
Further, Rivard restricts this social cohesion on a genetic basis by
species, which he otherwise rejects as an arbitrary way to limit per-
sonhood.152 Experience suggests that some animals are held in high
regard by strongly self-aware persons, such as the beloved pet of an
animal-loving, childless person. Because many pets, like most non-self-
aware children, are very important to strongly self-aware persons, by
similar logic these pets—or at least the favored elite animals held in
particular regard—should be imputed with constructive personhood
because of their value to the self-aware. To do otherwise would be
inconsistent. But if pets could be imputed with personhood, why
shouldn’t their killing be considered homicide?
These two results—permissible child-killing and pets with legal
personhood—seem not to reflect the concept of personhood implicit
in prevailing law. Thus, self-awareness in either a weak or strong form
is not the right criterion.
Indeed, the temptation to establish a single mental quality as de-
terminative of personhood may well produce an oversimplified
scheme for categorizing mental activity, especially if the quality must
be easily testable. Because mental activity involves a large number of
diverse capacities, animals resist being easily ranked on a single ladder
of being from the most advanced creature—conveniently humans, the
adopters of the scale—to the lowest bacterium. Rather than a single
quality, it may be better to weigh a number of capabilities to judge
whether a human-animal fusion should be categorized as a legal
person.153
151. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (confirming a competent person’s right to refuse
medical treatment); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731–35 (describing the State interest in prevent-
ing assisted suicide to protect “vulnerable persons,” such as disabled infants and the eld-
erly, from involuntary euthanasia).
152. See Rivard, supra note 21, at 1489–90 (discussing the rationale for not requiring
strong self-awareness from each individual, such as a baby, before granting them legal per-
sonhood); id. at 1466–70 (criticizing the limitation of personhood to genetically homo sapi-
ens organisms as akin to racism). Rivard’s apparent purpose—to protect infants from
exploitation—is laudable, but his theory as described does not seem to support it.
153. See Cobbe & Wilson, supra note 22, at 182 (ascribing human uniqueness to “a suite
of different characteristics” rather than a single factor).
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B. Comparing Humans with Chimpanzees Suggests Criteria for
Legal Personhood
From the time of the Thirteenth Amendment’s adoption until
today, animals such as chimpanzees and dolphins have been legal
nonpersons.154 Their status has not changed despite increasing scien-
tific evidence about their many humanlike capacities.155 Because they
are highly intelligent nonpersons, these species of animals provide
clues to the law’s implicit requirements for legal personhood.
Chimpanzees seem to have many characteristics that people asso-
ciate with humans. They can use simple tools to accomplish their
goals and they may prepare them in advance of their need.156 Unlike
less intelligent monkeys, they can recognize their reflections in a mir-
ror, suggesting that they have some capacity for self-consciousness.157
They may be taught some sign language, though the extent of their
capability for understanding the meaning of language has been ques-
tioned.158 But they are still legally nonpersons. Therefore, having
some capacity for tool use, self-consciousness, and language is not per
se qualification for legal personhood, though these capacities may be
evidence supporting personhood in an implicit threshold or totality of
the circumstances test.
Chimpanzees do seem to lack sophisticated human capacities,
such as the connection of actions with their moral significance. For
example, chimpanzees do not seem to have any understanding of
themselves or their troopmates as moral agents.159 Aberrant chimpan-
154. See Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World
Parks & Entm’t, Inc., No. 11cv2476 JM(WMC), 2012 WL 399214, at **3–5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2012) (discussing textual indications why the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition does
not apply to animals).
155. See infra notes 156–58.
156. MARY MIDGLEY, BEAST AND MAN: THE ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE 226–27 (Rout-
ledge rev. ed. 1995) (1979) (discussing chimpanzee tool use as described in JANE GOODALL,
IN THE SHADOW OF MAN app. C (rev. ed. 1988)).
157. IACOBONI, supra note 144, at 136–38 (describing the mirror experiments set forth
in Gordon G. Gallup, Jr., Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition, 167 SCIENCE 86 (1970)).
158. See, e.g., DOUGLAS KEITH CANDLAND, FERAL CHILDREN AND CLEVER ANIMALS: REFLEC-
TIONS ON HUMAN NATURE 318–19 (1993) (describing human-ape communication re-
searcher Hebert Terrace’s concerns that chimpanzees’ signing did not truly signify
language use and citing HERBERT S. TERRACE, NIM 221 (1979)).
159. MARY MIDGLEY, CAN’T WE MAKE MORAL JUDGEMENTS? 159–60 (1993) (discussing
the significance of chimpanzee nonjudgmentalism as observed by Jane Goodall); see JANE
GOODALL, THE CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE: PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR 351–52 (1986) (describing
a successful cannibalistic attack, followed by the mother’s apparent reconciliation with her
attacker less than two hours later). In Goodall’s more detailed description of one attack,
the attacked chimpanzee’s older child did attempt to help her mother. Id.
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zees have observed to kill and eat the young of other chimpanzees in
the same troop, and although the mothers attempted to stop the at-
tacks, the rest of the troop ignored the episode.160 The cannibalistic
chimpanzee was not afterwards treated differently by the others.161
Such apathy seems very difficult to imagine in humans observing the
murder and cannibalism of a neighbor’s children. Even if they could
not intervene, they would make judgments about the cannibal’s ac-
tions, and those judgments would almost certainly influence their
treatment of the cannibal. Among humans, an observer’s chimpanzee-
like apathy would likely provoke condemnation in its own right.
Despite its value, the moral sense should not be established as the
single, defining characteristic of legal persons any more than self-
awareness should be. Such a quality could be hard to identify in an-
other species unless the creature could describe its mental states to
humans, which would already demonstrate a degree of introspection
and abstract language use never before encountered in nonhuman
animals. Even so, if demonstrated, it would provide very good evi-
dence of personhood. The ability to understand a moral or legal pro-
hibition, like other high-level analytic or expressive mental
capabilities, is often demonstrated by humans and rarely (if ever) ob-
served in other species. Similar qualities requiring mental sophistica-
tion, such as high artistic ability or mathematical reasoning, should
also be interpreted as strong evidence of personhood.
The lower status of chimpanzees as compared to severely men-
tally impaired humans also suggests that the law’s criteria for legal
personhood include a presumption in favor of humans over other spe-
cies. Although this presumption could be viewed as an unreasonable
bias, it can be justified by the same implicit reasoning underlying the
general rejection of solipsism. People can plausibly infer from their
subjective experience of their own moral agency, self-awareness, and
personhood that other creatures like them also have these capacities
and are persons. This additional subjective evidence in favor of per-
sonhood supports a presumption favoring humans. For human-
animal fusions, this also suggests that human-derived organisms
should have a lower burden in proving that they are persons.
160. MIDGLEY, supra note 159, at 159.
161. Id.
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IV. The Proposed Test: The Source-Dependent Presumption
of Humanity
Using highly intelligent animal nonpersons as a threshold allows
the framework of a test for legal personhood to be assembled. Like
several of its antecedents,162 this test incorporates presumptions to as-
sign the burden of proof for legal personhood. To patent a human-
animal fusion, the patentee would need to overcome a presumption
that the fusion organism is a legal person. The burden of overcoming
this presumption would vary depending on the amount and type of
the genetic materials incorporated into the fusion organism.
The test’s specific details may not all emerge inevitably from the
underlying constitutional materials, but it is an attempt to interpret
them fairly to extract their implicit propositions and to construe their
application to the new case of human-animal fusion organisms. The
test’s goals are to create a broad framework applicable to any kind of
fusion organism, making the legal determination of personhood con-
sistent for all cases, and to tie the personhood analysis to benchmarks
set by animal nonpersons, making the test’s determination as objec-
tive and fact-based as possible.
Under the test, a particular fusion organism would first be classi-
fied into one of three groups: (1) organisms previously identifiable as
humans; (2) organisms not recognized as humans, but incorporating
human cells or genetic material; and (3) organisms neither recog-
nized as humans nor incorporating human cells or genetic material.
Each group would be subject to a different presumption controlling
the burden of proof for the determination of patentability and per-
sonhood. This tripartite division would provide the greatest protec-
tion to those organisms most likely to be legal persons and thus most
likely to suffer injustice if denied personhood.
162. See Rachel E. Fishman, Comment, Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures
Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 480–81 (1989) (proposing a defini-
tion of human being for incorporation into an amended Patent Act); Rivard, supra note
21, at 1487–88 (setting forth a chimera patentability test based on a narrowly defined form
of self-consciousness); Hagglund, supra note 7, at 79–80 (setting forth a chimera patenta-
bility test based on the balancing of mental capacity and physical similarity to humans); D.
Scott Bennett, Comment, Chimera and the Continuum of Humanity: Erasing the Line of Consti-
tutional Personhood, 55 EMORY L.J. 347, 379–86 (2006) (setting forth an alternative test also
using a presumption framework); Mark Jagels, Comment, Dr. Moreau Has Left the Island:
Dealing with Human-Animal Patents in the 21st Century, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 115, 142–43
(2000) (proposing a rebuttable presumption against patenting genes associated with “intel-
lect, behavior, or emotion”); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Do Androids Dream?”: Personhood and Intel-
ligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405, 419–28 (2011) (setting forth a capacity-based test for
the personhood of artificial intelligences).
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A. The First Group: Organisms Previously Identifiable as Human
Organisms
For the first group—any individual organisms formerly identifi-
able as a human organism—the presumption of humanity would be
nonrebuttable. Because under governing precedent, all living, born
humans are recognized as persons under the Constitution,163 no fu-
sion organisms that were previously recognized as human persons
would have their rights stripped away. This presumption would pro-
vide the rationale for preserving the constitutional rights of human
xenotransplantation recipients, including their Thirteenth Amend-
ment right not to be patented. For example, if a scientist patented a
genetically engineered animal organ useful for xenotransplantation,
patients receiving the organ could not be patented as a whole organ-
ism comprising the organ.
But the nonrebuttable presumption of humanity would not auto-
matically grant legal personhood to formerly human organisms at all
stages of development. Instead, the presumption would guarantee
that any organism that was once genetically human would have the
same rights that a human would at the same stage of development.
Under governing precedent, early-stage human embryos are not rec-
ognized as legal persons, but infant humans’ legal personhood is rec-
ognized by the time of their live birth.164 Although fusion embryos
that were once human organisms would receive no additional rights
than their genetically human counterparts,165 upon birth—or the
equivalent state of independent viability—they would be recognized
as legal persons just as human infants are.
This presumption would provide consistency with the status of
personhood granted to other human organisms. Infants are recog-
nized as legal persons without a test of their capacities, even if they are
both mentally and physically impaired. A fusion organism that was
previously a genetically human organism would be closely analogous
to a child with birth defects attributable to human-caused environ-
mental stresses. The difference would be that the fusion organism’s
“birth defects”—its animal component—would be produced inten-
163. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158–62 (1973) (recognizing newborn infants as
legal persons).
164. See id. (excluding the unborn from constitutional personhood, but not newborn
infants).
165. Cf. Streiffer, supra note 11, at 243–44 (suggesting that guidelines for chimeric
human-animal embryo research should be no less restrictive than for research on compara-
ble animals, but no more restrictive than for research on unmodified human embryos).
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tionally, not accidentally. This intentional damage to the organism
would provide even stronger reason to protect its rights, even if they
did not vest until birth.
If a fusion organism were radically modified, its original status
under the law might be unclear. For example, if a human brain were
transplanted into an artificial body composed of animal-derived or-
gans, it could be viewed either as previously a legal person, if the brain
were considered as the primary source for the organism, or previously
a nonperson, if the body were considered as the primary source. Be-
cause the brain is the physical locus of mental activity,166 the identifi-
cation of whether such a composite organism was previously a legal
person should depend on the original source of the brain. Therefore,
if a human head and brain could be grafted onto a pig’s body,167 the
newly piggish “humanimal”168 would still be recognized as an unpat-
entable human person.
B. The Second Group: Organisms Not Previously Recognized as
Human, But Possessing Human Genes
For the second group—individual organisms that are not recog-
nized as humans or persons under the law, but contain some human
genes or cells—the presumption of humanity would be rebuttable,
with the burden of proof placed on the prospective patentees. This
would allow patenting of fusion organisms if their prospective owners
could rebut the test’s presumption. Rebuttal would require passing a
two-prong test: (1) the mental capacity prong, a showing of suffi-
ciently low potential mental capacity so that the creature, when fully
developed, would not have mental facilities substantially superior to
the most intelligent or humanlike animals; and (2) the physical dis-
similarity prong,169 a showing that the creature, when fully developed,
would lack substantial similarity to human appearance. The second
prong of the test would apply mostly to protect humans, who might be
exploited or otherwise harmed under the guise of fictitious fusion
organisms.
166. See, e.g., STEPHEN WALKER, ANIMAL THOUGHT 106 (1983) (discussing the relation
between brain states and subjective awareness).
167. Such a direct graft likely would be impossible, but a piece-wise replacement of
over half of a human body by animal-derived or prosthetic replacements might not be.
168. Cf. CFM5632, Manimal (Ep 1), YOUTUBE (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=RS8CKij8YeU (coining a similar term to describe the series’ shape-shifting
protagonist).
169. Hagglund, supra note 7, at 79–80 (setting forth a rationale for a physical similarity
prong to a standard for humanity).
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Although each prong would require the evaluation of multiple
factors, this two-prong test would not balance each prong against the
other for the overall determination of personhood.170 Instead, its
prongs would be considered separately, with the separate prongs’
thresholds set to exclude all those species generally agreed not to be
legal persons under existing law. To avoid corruption of the test, the
test for personhood would lack a utility exception or factor.171 The
determination of whether an organism should qualify as a legal per-
son would be made without considering the advantages if the organ-
ism were not.
The threshold level for the mental capacity prong is difficult to
identify, but to minimize the chance of a false negative, the threshold
would be a highly intelligent animal that is currently accepted to be a
legal nonperson—the chimpanzee.172 An alternative animal for the
mental threshold test, and perhaps a better alternative for fusion orga-
nisms without hands, would be the dolphin.173 Given the number of
different characteristics associated with humanity—self-consciousness,
intentionality, moral agency, and the awareness of other creatures’
agency, among others174—evaluation of an organism’s mental capac-
ity would be based on the totality of circumstances. Would a reasona-
ble person, looking at the totality of circumstances, judge the creature
to be more humanlike than a chimpanzee or dolphin?
The reasonable person for the mental activity prong should be a
qualified expert in animal behavior. A reasonable, but unqualified
170. In contrast, Hagglund’s standard uses a “sliding scale” approach that balances a
chimera’s physical and mental similarity to humans. Id.
171. But see, e.g., Jagels, supra note 162, at 142–43 (proposing a rebuttable presumption
against patenting genes associated with “intellect, behavior[,] or emotion,” but allowing
rebuttal by a showing of “societal benefits”). Jagels makes his proposal regarding genes, so
it is not precisely analogous. However, regardless of the merits of his scheme for genes, it
should not be applied to creatures that may be persons with their own interests. The re-
fusal of constitutional rights to creatures when it would be useful for them to be nonper-
sons has unhappy historical parallels with nineteenth-century slavery.
172. See Stephen R. Munzer, Human-Nonhuman Chimeras in Embryonic Stem Cell Research,
21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 133–34 (2007) (defining “enhanced chimeras” as having cogni-
tive capacities equivalent to a chimpanzee and “dramatically enhanced chimeras” as having
capacities equivalent to a human). Munzer develops a set of moral principles for the crea-
tion and treatment of human-animal chimeras. Id. at 136–39. The presumption test pro-
posed in this Comment could be viewed as assigning the legal burden of persuasion for
adjudicating which category that a particular fusion organism occupies.
173. See, e.g., DONALD R. GRIFFIN, ANIMAL MINDS 211–17 (1992) (presenting evidence of
dolphins’ advanced mental capabilities).
174. Interestingly, chimpanzees and some other primates may already possess many of
these capabilities, though not at average human levels. See generally JIM GRIGSBY & DAVID
STEVENS, NEURODYNAMICS OF PERSONALITY 203 (2000).
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layperson is more likely to project humanlike characteristics onto
animal behavior, even unwarrantedly, and thus reach an incorrect
conclusion about the creature’s mind.175 This standard would be anal-
ogous to the “person having ordinary skill in the art” standard used
for determining nonobviousness in patent law.176 In contrast, the rea-
sonable person for the second, physical similarity prong should be an
ordinary citizen without special expertise, as the relevant quality—ap-
pearance—should be gauged on how ordinary citizens would perceive
the fusion if they encountered it. If an ordinary citizen would confuse
the fusion organism with a human, making it hard to assess whether a
particular creature were a legal person, then it would create too much
confusion and opportunity for abuse even if a qualified expert could
still distinguish the fusion organism from a human. For example, the
sale of humanlike chimera could become a cover for open human
trafficking.
This proposed test for estimating higher mental capacity carries
with it the flaw inherent to a totality of circumstances test: possible
inconsistency and unpredictability as different judges apply their own
individual standards to the test’s framework. Like the “reasonable per-
son” standard for tort liability, however, it is the best option available
for this particular problem. Given the widely disparate definitions of
human nature and purposes held by different subgroups within our
society, establishing a broadly accepted definition of distinctively
human characteristics applicable to all cases seems impossible.177 But
abandoning any attempt to distinguish humanlike from nonhuman-
like fusion organisms would allow troubling practices, such as the en-
forced servitude of near-human fusion organisms. Even otherwise
antagonistic subgroups are all highly likely to reject such practices as
wrong. Without a reasonable and socially accepted definition for what
constitutes the essence of humanity, the occasional inconsistency pro-
duced by a totality of the circumstances test is preferable to the risk of
consistent, severe injustice produced by restricting personhood only
to unmodified, genetically “pure” human persons.
175. See, e.g., KONRAD LORENZ, KING SOLOMON’S RING: NEW LIGHT ON ANIMAL WAYS
77–79 (Marjorie Kerr Wilson trans., Routledge Classics 2002) (1952) (discussing how naı¨ve
observers have mistakenly believed animals to be thinking, counting, or talking when they
were instead reacting to subtle, involuntary cues from their owners).
176. MPEP, supra note 62, § 2141 (instructing examiners how to determine if a patent
claim is obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103).
177. For example, a Roman Catholic and an atheist would weigh the capacity for form-
ing religious beliefs differently in assessing a fusion organism’s higher mental capacity.
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C. The Third Group: Organisms Not Previously Recognized as
Humans and Without Human Genes
For the third group—individual organisms not previously recog-
nized as humans or persons under the law and not possessing some
human genetic material or gene sequences—no presumption of un-
patentability would be applied. However, the organism would be clas-
sified as a legal person, and therefore unpatentable, if the trier of fact
could positively establish either (1) sufficiently high potential mental
capacity, which would give the organism near-humanlike capabilities;
or (2) physical similarity to humans, which would cause other humans
to interact with the fusion as if it were human.
These two prongs would be applied using the same standards as
the presumption of humanity discussed above, albeit for establishing
similarity rather than dissimilarity. The mental capacity prong would
require a showing that the creature, when fully developed, would have
mental facilities that were substantially greater than an unmodified
chimpanzee or dolphin. The physical similarity prong would require a
showing that the creature, when fully developed, would have a sub-
stantial similarity to human appearance.
This standard for the third group could be met by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, but it could also be applied as a presumption of
patentability under § 101, which would make any challenge to patent-
ability more difficult. Given that a hypothetical fusion-organism lab
animal would likely not be as capable of presenting its case as those
attempting to establish its patentability, a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard would likely be better than a presumption of
patentability.
D. Test Cases
Applying these criteria to some test cases allows a judgment of
how well the test would work. First, adult human xenotransplantation
recipients who received a pig organ or tissue would be unpatentable
legal persons under the test. They would have previously have been
recognized as humans and legal persons, making them part of the first
group with its nonrebuttable presumption of humanity.
A human-chimpanzee chimera that was created by adding chim-
panzee stem cells to a human embryo would also be unpatentable. As
a formerly human organism, the chimera would fall into the first
group with its nonrebuttable presumption of humanity. During the
embryo stage, it would only have the same rights as an analogous
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human embryo. But if implanted in a surrogate mother and carried to
term, the chimera would receive the same rights as an analogous
human infant: legal personhood and its accompanying civil rights, in-
cluding unpatentability under the Thirteenth Amendment.
A chimeric rat with a brain incorporating human nerve cells
would likely still be patentable. Because it would be a nonhuman or-
ganism that contained some human cells, it would fall into the second
group, so its inventors would need to rebut a presumption of its hu-
manity to patent it. However, rebutting the presumption would likely
not be difficult. If the size and organizational scheme of its brain were
still rodentlike, a reasonable scientist would expect its mental capabili-
ties to be low, which would meet the first, mental capacity prong of
the test.178 Its different brain cells would not make the rat’s appear-
ance humanlike, which would meet the second, physical dissimilarity
prong of the test.
A human-chimpanzee chimera with a human-derived heart, liver,
and intestines would also likely be patentable. Like the chimeric rat,
the chimpanzee’s human components would create a presumption of
its humanity and unpatentability, but the presumption would likely be
rebutted. A reasonable scientist would not expect the creature’s
human organs to affect the mental functions that distinguish humans
from chimpanzees, which would meet the mental capacity prong of
the test. The human internal organs would also not make the chim-
panzee appear more humanlike, which would meet the physical dis-
similarity prong.
However, a chimeric chimpanzee with all human brain cells or a
hybrid chimpanzee with human genes related to cognition would
likely not be patentable under this standard. The human nerve cells
or genes would create a rebuttable presumption of unpatentability,
and it would be difficult to overcome. Because the brain’s structure
and composition is related to mental activity, a reasonable scientist
might predict that such a creature would be more mentally humanlike
than its unmodified chimpanzee peers. If so, the presumption against
its patentability would stand. If only part of a chimpanzee’s brain were
replaced by human nerve cells, the result of the test would likely be
fact-specific. It might depend whether the human cells were incorpo-
rated into part of the brain associated with cognition, such as the cere-
brum, rather than part of the brain associated with the autonomous
178. But perhaps this underrates the effects that human cells would produce, for the
National Academy of Sciences has urged caution in creating chimeras with human nerve
cells. See NAT’L ACADS., FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at app. C §§ 6.4, 6.6, 7.3, 7.4, 9.0.
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nervous system, such as the brain stem.179 It might also turn on
whether the human cells assembled into more humanlike structural
elements.
A human-dog hybrid with human movie-star appearance and dog-
like mental facilities would also not be patentable. If the engineered
part of its genetic code were copied from the human genome, it
would have a presumption of unpatentability that would be difficult to
overcome. Though expert testimony would show that it were still only
as intelligent as a dog, which would meet the mental capacity prong, it
would be substantially similar to humans in appearance and would
thus fail the second prong of the test. Even if the hybrid’s genes were
constructed de novo without copying human gene sequences, making
it fall into the third group, its great similarity to the human form
would establish its unpatentability under the test. If it were declared a
nonperson, the opportunities for abuse and exploitation (both of it
and of humans) would be too great.
A dolphin bioengineered with artificial, nonhuman genes for en-
hanced cognition from a nonhuman mammal might be patentable
depending on the level of mental enhancement produced. The modi-
fied dolphin would fall into the third group, organisms neither previ-
ously recognized as human persons nor possessing human genetic
material. The dolphin would not be physically similar to humans,
meeting the second prong of the test for patentability. But it might
fail the first prong depending on how much the genes enhanced its
intelligence. In such a case, the trier of facts would have to assess ex-
pert testimony as to whether the fusion organism was substantially en-
hanced over unmodified dolphins, which would depend entirely on
the effects of the added genes.
In summary, this Comment sets forth a proposed test for patenta-
bility designed to avoid this possible harm: the source-dependent pre-
sumption of humanity. For any organism that was previously a fully
human organism, the presumption would be nonrebuttable. No one
who would otherwise be granted the legal rights of a person could
have them stripped away. For a genetically modified organism not pre-
viously human, but imbued with some human genetic material, the
presumption of humanity would be rebuttable. This would allow the
organism’s patenting if the organism’s inventors could show that their
inventions were substantially dissimilar to human persons both men-
179. See generally WALKER, supra note 166, at 174–93 (discussing the organization of the
brain in vertebrates and how certain areas correlate with different brain functions).
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tally and physically. For genetically modified organisms neither previ-
ously recognized as persons nor including human-derived materials,
no presumption would apply, but their personhood and un-
patentability could be established by a showing of physical or mental
similarity to humans.
V. Possible Complications with the Test and Some Proposed
Resolutions
Every legal test, if implemented, must be applied to the messy
particularity of actual disputes. And, here, trouble may arise. In prac-
tice, this proposed test would have some possible complications, but
they can be resolved.
A. A First Complication: Biological Unpredictability
The first complication is our limited ability to predict how a fu-
sion organism’s cells and genes would interact to produce some physi-
ological qualities, such as greater self-awareness or a humanlike
appearance. As scientific knowledge about fusion organisms and gene
function increases, predicting a fusion organism’s properties will
likely be less of an educated guess. Now, however, it would take much
better knowledge than we currently have to provide anything more
than a best guess. For the proposed totality of the circumstances test
to provide a meaningful restraint, the creators of a fusion organism
should be able to predict its capabilities. If this were impossible, it
would be necessary to make the fusion organism to determine its pat-
entability. Because the resulting uncertainty would make it harder to
predict the return from such projects, it would discourage private
innovation.
One possible solution to this problem is to use a reasonability
standard to identify whether a reasonable molecular biologist or ge-
neticist would predict that the organism would have a particular prop-
erty. During prosecution of a patent application claiming a fusion
organism, the patent examiner would reject a claim based on its
prima facie likelihood of encompassing particular claim embodiments
that would fail the presumption of humanity test, and the applicant
would have the opportunity to rebut the examiner’s arguments. This
is analogous with how a U.S. patent examiner would apply prior art to
determine if the reasonable person of skill in the art would find pat-
ent claims to be nonobvious,180 so examiners would have some experi-
180. MPEP, supra note 62, § 2141.
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ence with a similar test. But the reasonability standard would be more
difficult to apply. It would require the reasonable molecular biolo-
gist’s prediction of characteristics that the reasonable expert in animal
behavior would identify under the totality of circumstances. This pre-
diction of two hypothetical persons’ opinions seems challenging for
an examiner or jury to evaluate fairly and predictably.
A better alternative would be to make the assessment based on
the patent applicant’s good-faith analysis of whatever evidence that
there was at the time of the patent’s examination. This would fall
within the current duty of disclosure, which requires applicants and
their agents to provide the USPTO with any known information that
would be material to the determination of their claims’ patentabil-
ity.181 A good-faith analysis would likely prevent patents on creatures
most likely to be legal persons, given that the scientists conducting the
experiments would likely know what qualities that they intended to
produce and would have a duty of disclosure to provide relevant evi-
dence to the USPTO. This might seem to provide less protection to
the hypothetical fusion organism, as it could encourage scientists to
avoid learning things that might lead to an inconvenient good-faith
belief. But despite this possible pitfall, it would likely be a better, more
practically applicable alternative.
Under either standard, if new evidence was produced tending to
show more humanlike properties, the patent would preferably be
challengeable through some form of administrative procedure, such
as a modified form of reexamination based on published evidence of
the fusion organism’s capabilities.182 This mechanism would allow cor-
rection of any mistakes in the initial determination, which would help
to prevent injustice. Given the uncertainties involved in appraisals of
an animal’s mental capabilities, this would also allow for modification
of an organism’s status as more information about its capabilities be-
came available.
181. See MPEP, supra note 62, § 2001 (stating applicants’ duty of disclosure to the
USPTO under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2011)).
182. For such a reexamination-based procedure to be effective, it would have to allow
submission of art published after the filing date of the patent. This would likely require a
statutory change. See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (providing a statutory basis for reexamination
based on “prior art”); MPEP, supra note 62, § 2003.01 (discussing ex parte reexamination
based on prior art); cf. Thomas Schneck, Patenting Human Life, a Multidimensional Problem,
32 LINCOLN L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2004) (proposing a “Rule of Doubt” allowing postissuance
challenge of human cloning patents not “clearly violative” of the Patent Office’s
guidelines).
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B. A Second Complication: Measuring Mental Capabilities
A second complication would be evaluating the mentality of fu-
sion organisms, especially nonhumanlike organisms. For example, the
mental capacities of a whale or octopus with human brain cells or
spliced human brain-related genes would be hard to determine. Its
different sensory capabilities and temperament would make it harder
for a human to understand the fusion organism’s perception of the
world around it. Even if genetic manipulations made these
nonhumans the mental equals of humans, their very different nature
might make them express their intelligence in a very different way.183
For example, attempts to communicate with other creatures might
not interest a naturally solitary or asocial creature even if genetic engi-
neering gave it greater linguistic capabilities.
But as with the first complication, as scientific knowledge about
gene function increases, predicting a fusion organism’s properties will
likely become less of an educated guess. Further, as a creature became
the target of genetic engineering, understanding its perceptual capa-
bilities and behavior would likely become a higher priority, especially
if such an understanding it were necessary to overcome a presumption
of unpatentability. The resulting scientific work would help in assess-
ing the creature’s mental capacity. And because of their greater dis-
similarity to humans, more unusual creatures like octopuses may also
be less useful for medical experimentation. Thus, these harder in-
stances of the problem would be less common in the test’s actual
application.
Although the difficulty of assessing a fusion organism’s mental
abilities would have to be considered in the totality of the circum-
stances test for mental capacity, this problem should not destroy the
test’s applicability or usefulness.
183. Given the different habitat and habits of such creatures, they are more likely to
have different perceptual abilities and ways of responding to their environment than
humans. These differences could make it harder to apply human tests for mental capabili-
ties. See Munzer, supra note 172, at 131 n.34 (citing LESLEY J. ROGERS, MINDS OF THEIR OWN:
THINKING AND AWARENESS IN ANIMALS 56–57 (1997)) (noting that a test measuring animal
IQ may be impossible because animal species vary so much in their senses and in their
manner of processing information). See generally Todd M. Preuss, What Is It Like to Be a
Human?, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III, at 5 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 3d ed. 2004)
(comparing distinctive features of human cognitive specialization with other animals).
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C. A Third Complication: Standing to Challenge the Determination
of Personhood
Both complications of the test discussed above would require in-
terested parties to challenge the patents to assure that any later evi-
dence about a creature’s mental capabilities is released. Given the
history of chimera patents, any patent specifically directed to human-
animal fusions will likely be challenged by animal-rights groups or an-
tibiotechnology activists, especially if it seemingly exceeded USPTO
guidelines. Without banning fusion organism experiments or making
the entire subject matter area unpatentable, one possible way to en-
courage the release of information would be allowing third parties
standing to challenge the patent based on later evidence of the pat-
ented creature’s personhood. Although a California court has re-
jected an animal-rights group’s attempt to gain standing on behalf of
killer whales, a similar approach for an entirely novel creature might
be viewed more favorably.184
Another way that might result in fewer lawsuits would be to estab-
lish an alternative procedure for challenging these patents after issu-
ance, whether by an administrative process like patent reexamination
or a more quasi-judicial process. A general postgrant opposition pro-
cedure was included in the America Invents Act, though it was re-
stricted to references submitted very soon after issuance.185 This
proposed procedure would probably not allow enough time for evi-
dence about the organisms’ characteristics to emerge. But if the time
line were to be extended, the criteria for a challenge under such a
method should be restricted to avoid a “heckler’s veto”186 for all pat-
ents involving chimeras and hybrids.
184. Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World
Parks & Entm’t, Inc., No. 11cv2476 JM(WMC), 2012 WL 399214, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2012) (rejecting a suit filed in behalf of killer whales); see also Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386
F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying standing for cetaceans to sue).
185. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 288, 340 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. to in-
clude §§ 321–329, which set forth the new mechanism for postgrant review available up to
nine months after a patent’s issuance or reissue).
186. A heckler’s veto is an objector’s ability to prevent speech by the threat of a violent
response. See Ruth McGafffey, The Heckler’s Veto: A Reexamination, 40 MARQ. L. REV. 39,
39–41 (1973) (discussing the problem of the heckler’s veto). Here, the veto would be re-
peated challenges to a disliked patent right.
1122 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
D. A Final Complication: The USPTO’s Authority to Set Limits to
Patentability
A common objection to the USPTO’s delineating a boundary of
patentable subject matter is that only Congress, and not the USPTO,
has the authority to draw such a line.187 In practice, however, the
USPTO has more interpretive discretion than such an objection al-
lows. Given any particular application that is controversial, the agency
must make a prima facie determination whether the particular case
meets the statutory and constitutional standards for patentability. In
the absence of judicial precedent that authoritatively interprets the
appropriate statutory and constitutional provisions, the agency’s of-
ficers must use their judgment to predict what the authoritative inter-
pretation will be. They cannot avoid making a judgment: establishing
a policy permitting the controversial application is in effect judging
that the courts will agree that it is patentable. As Chakrabarty and the
America Invents Act show, establishing a patentability policy using the
agency’s best understanding of the law will encourage judicial or legis-
lative clarification of the law. If the agency’s policy were to prove irrel-
evant, no one would care enough to contest it. But if the policy were
to impact a growing field of lucrative scientific research, it would likely
provoke a challenge that would result in a better definition of the law.
Conclusion
This Comment has proposed that the Thirteenth Amendment
presents an absolute bar to any human ownership of humans, even
through patent rights. This bar can best be applied to human-animal
fusion organisms through a source-dependent presumption test for
determining their legal personhood. Although the Constitution has
187. See, e.g., DeBre´, supra note 71, 250–52 (arguing that the USPTO has no authority
or competence to reject a patent for unconstitutionality); see also Rivard, supra note 21, at
1443 & n.72 (arguing that without congressional delegation the USPTO “clearly lacks au-
thority” to distinguish humans from nonhumans, and Supreme Court precedent gives an
administrative agency only narrow authority to interpret the law implicating a fundamental
right like freedom from slavery). Rivard also argues that courts could also invoke the rarely
used nondelegation doctrine to prevent the USPTO from interpreting the Thirteenth
Amendment. Id. at 1443 n.74.
The AIA’s explicit prohibition of patenting humans, however, should provide the
USPTO with authority to interpret whether inventions fall within the scope of the statutory
provision just as it did for multicellular organisms. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat.
288, 340 (2011) (stating the statutory prohibition); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932
F.2d 920, 927–28 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the USPTO’s authority to issue substantive
and interpretive rules). And here the USPTO would act to protect the possible exercise of
a fundamental right rather than to curtail it.
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no explicit definition for legal persons, the criteria for the test can be
inferred from the specific rules of currently governing law and from
empirical investigation of animal cognition. By explicitly implement-
ing such a test, the USPTO could both provide guidance for investiga-
tors seeking patent rights and provoke whatever further judicial and
legislative refinement of the test that is necessary.
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